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State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to




Constitutions govern governments: they create governments, grant them
powers, and impose limits on the exercise of granted powers. In the American
legal order, constitutional rights are conventionally understood to apply to and
restrain the level of government created by the constitution in which those
rights appear. Rights appearing in a national constitution thus restrain the
national government, rights enumerated in a state constitution restrain the state
government and so on.' Occasionally, a constitution also contains rights that
restrain lower levels of government. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, for example, creates individual rights that restrain state
governments,2 and rights identified in state constitutions typically constrain the
exercise of power by county and municipal governments.3 However, it is
conventionally understood that individual rights in a lower-order constitution
apply solely to the lower level government and thus have no relevance to the
actions of any higher level of government.
In this Article, I challenge this conventional understanding. Individual rights
in state constitutions, I argue, can in many circumstances restrain the exercise of
national power. State constitutional rights do not, of course, constrain the
national government as a matter of positive law; the Supremacy Clause4 of the
U.S. Constitution subordinates state law to national law as a matter of positive
Copyright 2003, James A. Gardner.
* Professor of Law, State University of New York, University at Buffalo Law School. Thanks to
Helen Hershkoff, Robert Schapiro, Alan Tarr, and Bob Williams for valuable comments on a previous
draft, and to Jesse Baldwin for research assistance.
1. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51 (1833) (holding the U.S. Bill of
Rights inapplicable to the states); State v. Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315, 1324-25 (N.J. 1989) ("[A] state
constitution ordinarily governs only the conduct of the state's own agents or others acting under color
of state law. .... [A] state's constitution ... will not be applied to control the conduct of the officers of a
foreign jurisdiction.").
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
3. C. DALLAS SANDS ET AL., 2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 13.09 (1994-97) ("It is axiomatic that local
governments cannot exercise powers which are repugnant to the federal or state constitution.")
(citations omitted).
4. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
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political authority. Nevertheless, the identification and enforcement of state
constitutional rights can serve as a mechanism by which state governments can
resist and, to a degree, counteract abusive exercises of national power. State
constitutional rights, that is to say, can be weapons of state resistance to national
tyranny in a federal system of divided power.
To see how state constitutional rights serve this purpose, we must make a
small but significant shift in how we conceptualize state power. Conventionally,
we tend to understand the purposes for which any government's powers exist to
be given by the constitution that creates the government in question.5 This
understanding follows naturally from the Lockean conception of constitutions
that dominates our legal system.6 According to that conception, a constitution is
a deliberate, foundational act of an independent polity asserting its natural right
to self-governance. 7 In creating its constitution, that polity-and no other-
establishes its governmental institutions in the way it thinks best, for purposes
it, and it alone, thinks appropriate. 8
This model works well enough for national constitutions. Nation-states often
relate to one another in a real-world approximation of the Lockean (or perhaps
Hobbesian) state of nature,9 and national polities occasionally coalesce and
create national governments in acts of more or less genuinely independent
self-creation. The same model, however, does not apply equally well to sub-
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstand-
ing.").
5. See, e.g., U.S. Const. pmbl:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice,
insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare,
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America.
6. See generally James A. Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy and Elections: Implementing Popular
Sovereignty Under the Lockean Constitution, 52 U. Prr. L. REV. 189, 200-13 (1990). Regarding
Locke's influence on state constitutions in particular, see, for example, MARC W. KRUMAN, BETWEEN
AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY: STATE CONSTITUTION MAKING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 53-54 (1997).
7. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 4, 87, 89, 95-99, 132, 134--42 (C.B.
Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ'g. Co. 1980) (1690). These ideas are clearly echoed in THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776), as well as other early sources. See Gardner, supra note 6, at
206-11.
8. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776):
[W]henever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the
People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such
principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect
their Safety and Happiness.
9. See LOCKE, supra note 7, § 14:
It is often asked as a mighty objection, where are, or ever were there any men in such a state
of nature? To which it may suffice as an answer at present, that since all princes and rulers of
independent governments all through the world, are in a state of nature, it is plain the world
never was, nor ever will be, without numbers of men in that state.
On the Hobbesian state of nature, see THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 63-66 (Ernest Rhys ed., J.M. Dent &
Sons 1937) (1651) (describing "state of nature" as a state of war of all against all).
1004
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national constitutions created by states or provinces that are subdivisions of
more comprehensive nations. In the American setting, the Lockean model of
independent political self-creation does not adequately describe state-level con-
stitutional processes because it ignores the fact that American states are part of a
nationwide federal system of dispersed power-a system created at the national
level by, and to a considerable extent managed under the auspices of, the U.S.
Constitution.1° Because states are in some ways cogs in a national apparatus,
the purposes for which state power exists are not given exclusively by a state
polity in the state's constitution, but are also determined to some extent by the
national polity in the national constitution. State power, in other words, exists
not only to serve the state polity in the achievement of state goals, but also to
serve the national polity in the achievement of national goals. States are part of
an interlocking plan of federalism devised collectively by the people of the
nation and maintained by them as part of a comprehensive plan designed to
serve the overriding national purpose of protecting the liberty of all Ameri-
cans."' From this perspective, elaborated further below, it becomes possible to
see that individual rights granted in state constitutions serve the purpose not
only of protecting individuals against tyrannical acts of state governments, but
also against tyrannical acts of the national government.
This view of state power and state constitutional rights provides an additional
benefit: it points toward a fuller and more satisfying account of state constitu-
tional interpretation than do the models that currently dominate this now
long-standing jurisprudential debate. The principal reigning theories of state
constitutional interpretation decree, roughly speaking, that state constitutions be
interpreted either completely independently of national constitutional law, or in
nearly complete dependence upon it. Both of these prescriptions flow from
erroneous understandings of the nature of state power in a federal system. To
urge that state constitutions be interpreted completely independently from the
U.S. Constitution is to treat states as truly independent Lockean sovereigns.
Conversely, to urge that state constitutions be interpreted whenever possible in
agreement with national constitutional law treats states as mere decentralized
administrative subdivisions of a national governing apparatus. Neither view
incorporates the complexities-and ambiguities-that characterize the nature of
states and the functions of state power in a truly federal system of divided
sovereignty. The approach to state power I advocate here takes a more realistic
10. For example, the U.S. Constitution plays a vital role in preventing the national government from
invading authority allocated to the states. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 608-12 (2000) (limitation on federal commerce power); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 923-25 (1997) (same). It similarly prevents states from encroaching upon authority allocated
exclusively to the national government. See, e.g., City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978)
(limitation on state power to regulate commerce); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (limitation
on state power in foreign affairs).
11. As Morton Grodzins put it in his groundbreaking work on federalism, the "American federal
system [is] a single mechanism." MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF GOVERN-
MENT IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (1966).
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step toward capturing this complexity in a functional jurisprudence of state
constitutional interpretation. Specifically, the functional approach developed
here leads to the perhaps paradoxical conclusion that state courts may in some
circumstances be fully justified in interpreting provisions of state constitutions
for the express purpose of disagreeing with, undermining, and attempting
actively to ameliorate any harm caused by decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court
that, in the state courts' view, do not adequately protect rights secured by the
national constitution.
Part I of this Article sets out what I call a "functional" account of state power
within the American system of federalism. This account stresses the role that
federalism contemplates for state power as a means of monitoring the exercise
of power by the national government and restraining its abuse. In this account,
national power and state power are divided in pursuit of a common goal: the
protection of liberty for all Americans. In the course of this account, Part I
describes the various tools available to the national and state governments to
check abuses by the other.
Part II fits state constitutional rights into the framework of federalism's
system of mutual governmental checking. It explains how individual rights
found in state constitutions can be invoked by state courts not only to counteract
abuses of power by the state government actors directly restrained by such
rights, but also-perhaps counterintuitively-to resist abuses of power by the
national government itself. This conception of state constitutional rights has its
greatest application in checking abuses of national judicial power by the United
States Supreme Court. Specifically, I argue in Part II that state judicial rejection
of and divergence from purportedly incorrect or abusive Supreme Court prece-
dents concerning the scope of individual rights helps to check national power in
at least four ways. First, whenever a state court dissents from the reasoning of a
U.S. Supreme Court decision, it offers a forceful and very public critique, which
can in the long run influence the formation of public and, eventually, official
opinion on the propriety of that federal ruling. Second, state constitutional
rulings that depart from or criticize U.S. Supreme Court precedents can contrib-
ute to the establishment of a nationwide legal consensus at the state level, a
factor that the Supreme Court sometimes considers in the course of its own
constitutional decisionmaking. Third, generous state interpretations of indi-
vidual rights can check national power more directly, by prohibiting state and
local governments from exercising authority permitted them under the U.S.
Constitution to suppress certain kinds of private behavior. In so doing, state
courts create spaces in which otherwise prohibitable behavior may flourish.
Finally, rights-protective rulings by state courts can help ameliorate the harm to
liberty caused by narrow national rulings by providing protection for second-
best alternatives to the types of behavior that such national rulings permit
governments to suppress.
Part III concludes by sketching out briefly some of the consequences of this
approach to state constitutional rights for the interpretation of state constitu-
1006 [Vol. 91 :1003
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tions. First, application of the functional approach suggests that state courts
construing their state constitutions must conceive of federal constitutional law
as nearly always highly relevant to the interpretation of state constitutional
rights, but rarely conclusive for it. Second, the functional approach reveals that
an appropriate and, indeed, necessary function of state courts when construing
their state constitutions is actively to monitor and, when necessary, to attempt to
resist and undermine constitutional constructions by federal courts that fail
adequately to secure rights protected by the national document.
I. A FUNCTIONAL ACCOUNT OF STATE POWER
A. THE BASIC MECHANICS OF FEDERALISM
"The accumulation of all powers ... in the same hands," wrote Madison
"may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." 12 To protect liberty,
then, power must be divided. Federalism serves this guiding principle of
American constitutional design by parceling out government powers among
different levels of government. Federalism, it must be borne in mind, is a
creation of the national Constitution, not state constitutions. It is not the result
of a fortuitous series of agreements reached one by one by the separate peoples
of the original thirteen states; on the contrary, federalism represents the deliber-
ate decision of a single national polity to divide governmental power for the
purpose of protecting the liberty of all. 13
Federalism protects liberty by giving the state and national levels of govern-
ment substantial powers sufficient to allow each to monitor and check the
abuses of the other.14 As with the horizontal separation of powers that divides
governmental power into legislative, executive, and judicial branches, each
level of government in this vertically fragmented system is given the power and
incentive to struggle against the other: "Ambition," as Madison put it, "must be
made to counteract ambition."' 15 The result is a compound federal republic in
which power is deeply fragmented, reducing as far as possible by structural
means the likelihood that a tyrannical measure of power can be accumulated in
a single set of hands:
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
13. See, e.g., SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 1-2,
20-21 (1993); WILLIAM P. MURPHY, THE TRIUMPH OF NATIONALISM: STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE FOUNDING
FATHERS, AND THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1967). This position, of course, rejects the compact
theory of the Constitution. One would have thought this point uncontroversial and well-documented.
See, e.g., BEER, supra; MURPHY, supra; Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L. J.
1425 (1987). Recently, however, four justices of the U.S. Supreme Court have flirted with a conception
of American nationhood that looks considerably like the compact theory. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The ultimate source of the Constitution's
authority is the consent of the people of each individual State, not the consent of the undifferentiated
people of the Nation as a whole.").
14. Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After
Garcia, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 341, 380-95.
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people, is submitted to
the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded
against by a division of the government into distinct and separate depart-
ments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the
people, is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion
allotted to each, subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a
double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments
will controul each other; at the same time that each will be controuled by
itself. 16
The multiplicity of power centers in the American scheme can create the
impression that the system is chaotic-a pure, Hobbesian war of all against all
without any purpose other than the accumulation of power. This is not the
case--or at least need not be the case. In the Framers' view, what unifies the
dispersion of governmental power is the people, for the entire system is
designed to assure as far as possible that their wishes be done and their liberties
left intact.' 7 "The Foederal and State Governments," Madison observes, "are in
fact but different agents and trustees of the people, instituted with different
powers, and designated for different purposes."' 8 Federalism is thus more than a
passive institutionalization of social conflict; it is a dynamic system that is
designed to be manipulated by the people to produce results they desire.
Hamilton put this point clearly:
[I]n a confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be said to be
entirely the masters of their own fate. Power being almost always the rival of
power; the General Government will at all times stand ready to check the
usurpations of the state governments; and these will have the same disposition
towards the General Government. The people, by throwing themselves into
either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If their fights are invaded by
either, they can make use of the other, as the instrument of redress.' 9
Thus, the Framers expressly contemplated that popular allegiances to any
government would not be fixed organically, but would ebb and flow according
to that government's instrumental value to the populace at any given time. Each
16. Id. at 351.
17. VINCENT OSTROM, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF A COMPOUND REPUBLIC: DESIGNING THE AMERICAN
EXPERIMENT 23 (2d ed. 1987).
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 315 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 179 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 46, at 317 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961), in which Madison, after
remarking that Americans place their faith and trust primarily in their state governments, observed:
If ... the people should in future become more partial to the ftederal than to the State
governments, the change can only result, from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a better
administration as will overcome all their antecedent propensities. And in that case, the people
ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they may
discover it to be most due ....
1008 (Vol. 91:1003
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level of government would have sufficient power to check any tyrannical
tendencies of the other level, but the people would decide when and whether to
activate this checking power.20 The "double security" of which Madison spoke,
then, does not arise so much from some complicated scheme of complementary
powers, as is so often supposed, but from a much simpler arrangement in which
the state and national governments independently police much of the same
turf.2' To protect that turf, the people make use of whichever level of govern-
ment is more capable and accommodating at any particular moment.
Historically, federalism seems to have worked in much the way that the
Framers anticipated. In the early days of the republic, the people identified far
more strongly with their states than with the nation and looked predominantly to
the states when government power was needed.22 The Civil War disrupted this
pattern by enhancing national power and prestige throughout the North and
among blacks and white unionists in the South, while driving most white
Southerners to significantly distrust national power.23 Trust in state governments
enjoyed a resurgence during the late Nineteenth Century, particularly after
public opinion turned against the northern occupation of the South and the
Union programs of Reconstruction. 4 The Progressive reform movement of the
early Twentieth Century, followed quickly by the Great Depression, two world
wars, and the Civil Rights Movement, set the nation on a path in which national
power was typically far more respected and trusted than state power.25 By the
1980s, however, resentment against national power seemed to rise once again.26
20. See BEER, supra note 13, at 300-07.
21. See THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS 6 (1990); Amar,
supra note 13, at 1429-66; Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for the Old World, 58 U. CHI.
L. REV. 483, 498 (1991); Martin Landau, Federalism, Redundancy and System Reliability, 3 PUBLIUS
No. 2, 1973, at 173; Todd B. Pettys, Competing for the People's Affection: Federalism's Forgotten
Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REV. 329 (2003).
22. Gordon S. Wood, State Constitution-Making in the American Revolution, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 911,
911 (1993).
23. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 23-24
(1988) (describing rise of national consciousness following the Emancipation Proclamation, which
"clothed national authority with an indisputably moral purpose"); Larry Kramer, Understanding
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1557-58 (1994) (listing "the fact that the South lost the Civil War"
among factors that "helped to make national identity more important than state identity").
24. See, e.g., FONER, supra note 23, at 582 ("1877 marked a decisive retreat from the idea, born
during the Civil War, of a powerful national state protecting the fundamental rights of American
citizens."); FORREST McDONALD, STATES' RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO, 1776-1876, at
208-21 (2000) (describing the rise of states' rights ideology during the 1870s); id. at 223 ("For six
decades after the end of Reconstruction, [intrusion by the federal government into exercise of state
power] was, except during World War 1, rare and ineffective; attempts to encroach upon the powers
reserved to the states were struck down by the Supreme Court and were disapproved by the vast
majority of Americans."); MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, I A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTrru-
TIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 477 (2002) (describing the abandonment of the Republican
Party's commitment to national authority after 1877).
25. See Keith E. Whittington, Dismantling the Modern State? The Changing Structural Foundations
of Federalism, 25 HASiNGS CONST. L.Q. 483, 500-03 (1998).
26. See id. at 503-22.
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Today, we may well live in an age in which the people are as close to true
indifference between national and state power as they have ever been, and are
willing to contemplate the exercise of power by either level of government,
depending upon which level can more persuasively demonstrate that it can do
the better job.27
B. HOW FEDERALISM WORKS IN PRACTICE
1. How the National Government Protects Liberty
State power is a vital element in federalism's design. To put the exercise of
state power in context, however, I begin by examining the ways in which
federalism contemplates that national power may be deployed to protect liberty.
In conducting this analysis, I shall use the term "liberty" in a broad sense. The
concept of "liberty" is often equated with the restraint of government power-
the kind of "negative" liberty that Isaiah Berlin defined as freedom from
government interference with private decisionmaking.2 8 Although this understand-
ing of liberty captures much of what federalism operates to protect, it is
incomplete. If private decisionmaking were the sine qua non of collective life,
no government would be necessary whose powers would then require restraint.
Government is created and granted powers in the first instance to help citizens
achieve some kind of good life, a good life they are by hypothesis incapable of
achieving on their own, either individually or collectively, in the absence of
governmental organization. 29 To fulfill this function, government needs affirma-
tive powers, not only restraints on its powers. Thus, although federalism
contemplates the division of power to protect "liberty," I shall treat this conven-
tional use of the word as a kind of synecdoche that names only one part of the
broader notion of achieving, or creating the conditions that enable citizens to
achieve, a substantively desirable way of life. Under this broad definition of
liberty, the national government of the United States contributes to and protects
the liberty of American citizens in at least three distinct ways: (1) by using its
affirmative powers in pursuit of the good, 30 (2) by practicing self-restraint, and
(3) by restraining state governments from impairing the ability of citizens to
achieve the good.
27. The events of September It, 2001 may have changed the balance once again, shifting the focus
of trust to the national government. See Linda Greenhouse, Will the Court Reassert National Author-
ity?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, at 4:14; David Lightman, Poll Tracks National Growth in Trust; A
Strong Majority Likes and Trusts the U.S. Government for the First Time Since the Vietnam Era,
HARTFORD CoutRAN , Nov. 29, 2001, at A l; John Nienstedt, Social Values Emerging from the Rubble of
Sept. 11, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 28, 2001, at B7.
28. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 122-31 (Oxford U.
Press 1969) (1958).
29. This is the standard Enlightenment account of government: individuals trade a life lived
individually, outside of government, for one lived collectively as a way of improving their position. See
LOCKE, supra note 7, §§ 4, 77, 87-89, 95-99.
30. I would include in this category maintenance of physical order, see U.S. CONST. pmbl., although
that function might also be viewed as a precondition for the existence of liberty in any social setting.
[Vol. 91:10031010
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First and foremost, the national government protects liberty by using its
affirmatively granted powers for the good of the citizenry. This conception of
governmental power is broad enough to embrace any conception of the state,
from a minimalist, night-watchman state3 1 to the contemporary European-style
social welfare state. Whatever version of the state a society chooses to adopt, a
government must exist and must possess certain powers that enable the polity
collectively to achieve the goals that it sets for itself. Under the U.S. Constitu-
tion, the national government has many powers that fit this description. The
commerce power,32 spending power, 33 and various military powers34 have all
been used many times to achieve through direct action by the national govern-
ment objectives that the American polity has collectively decided will make it
better off. The commerce power alone, for example, has given us environmental
regulation; social, health, and welfare programs; most of the administrative
state; and even much of our civil rights legislation, to name only a few of its
principal uses.
35
Second, in the American scheme, the national government protects the liberty
of the citizenry by practicing a kind of institutionalized self-restraint. By so
doing, government protects the nation's citizens from itself.36 The U.S. Constitu-
tion contains several mechanisms that restrain the national government's ability
to do things that would make society worse off. Horizontal separation of
powers, for example, restrains the amount of harm the government can do by
dividing power among three branches and pitting those branches against one
another.37 This arrangement restricts the government's ability to take any action
that does not have the broad and overlapping approval of several distinct and
important constituencies. The enumeration of specific individual rights in the
Bill of Rights and elsewhere in the Constitution further restrains the scope of
31. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
32. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
33. Id., cl. 1. The power to spend for the general welfare, although not explicitly mentioned in the
text, has been inferred from the explicit power to raise revenue. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65
(1936).
34. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §§ II (power to declare war), 12 (power to raise and support armies), 13
(power to provide and maintain a navy), 14 (power to regulate the armed forces).
35. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981)
(sustaining Surface Mining and Reclamation Act as a legitimate use of the congressional commerce
power); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (same for Civil Rights Act of
1964). The commerce power has been described as justifying "expanding federal power over social
welfare legislation," James F. Blumstein, Federalism and Civil Rights: Complementary and Competing
Paradigms, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1251, 1273-74 (1994), and as establishing the foundation for "the
constitutional legitimation of the modern federal administrative state," Thomas 0. Sargentich, The
Question of the Future of the Administrative Process, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 149, 151 (1997).
36. As Madison stated, "In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the
great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the
next place oblige it to control itself." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).
37. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47, at 324; 48, at 332; 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
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government activity.38 In addition, an independent judiciary armed with the
power of judicial review helps to assure that constitutional restraints are effec-
tively observed.39
Of course, these restraints are purchased at the price of limiting the amount of
good the national government can do; only in virtue of the grant to government
of affirmative powers to do good in the first instance does it become necessary
to restrain the use of those powers through institutionalized forms of self-restraint. At
work here is a presumption that certain kinds of private activities do not violate
liberty-in fact, that they amount to an exercise of it. 40 Constitutional self-
restraint protects these kinds of activities, to the extent they can be identified in
advance, by taking from government the power to interfere with them.
The third way in which the American national government protects the liberty
of its citizens is by using its powers to prevent state governments from
impairing the good of the citizenry. To accomplish this purpose, the U.S.
government has several tools at its disposal. Bounding the spectrum of available
means for restraining state power are two methods that are perhaps best thought
of as extra-constitutional: force and talk.
At one extreme, the national government may use force against the states to
defend the liberty of its citizens. The Constitution specifically authorizes the
national government to use force to defend states, 41 but nothing in the Constitu-
tion provides similar authorization for the use of force against them. Neverthe-
less, the principle that the national government is entitled to enforce its laws
against violations and interference has long been taken to support the proposi-
tion that the use of force against states may be justified when necessary to
enforce federal law.42 This approach has been invoked on several occasions,
including, most notably, during the Civil War. In the Twentieth Century, the
armed enforcement of desegregation in Little Rock, Arkansas, stands out as a
prominent example of the national government's use of force to enforce federal
laws against the states.43 Although the national government has seldom used
force against a state government, the threat of it surely lurks meaningfully in the
background as a reason for states to avoid persistent violations of, or interfer-
ence with, national law.
38. U.S. CONST. amends. 1-8, 14.
39. See U.S. CONST. art. III; THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 521 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
40. On the notion of private ordering furnishing a baseline for purposes of constitutional adjudica-
tion, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONsTrruTION 68-92 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner'
Legacy, 87 COLJUM. L. REV. 873 (1987).
41. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall ... protect each [state] against Invasion; and
on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened)
against domestic Violence.").
42. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (affirming requirement that Arkansas comply with
federal judicial order to desegregate Little Rock public schools); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black)
635 (1863) (upholding President Lincoln's imposition of a blockade on southern ports).
43. See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1954-63, at 222-24
(1989) for a description of events now known as "the Little Rock Crisis."
1012 [Vol. 91:1003
2003] STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AS RESISTANCE TO NATIONAL POWER 1013
At the other end of the spectrum lies the entirely peaceful method of political
negotiation. Through political contacts and negotiation, national officials can
attempt to persuade or induce state officials to act in desirable ways. Such a
dialogue occasionally happens at the highest levels, as when President George
H.W. Bush convened an "education summit" with state governors in 1989 to
persuade them of his ideas concerning public education reform.44 More com-
monly, negotiation and persuasion occur constantly at low levels of government
administration. 45 Such negotiation may involve anything from the simple com-
munication of pertinent information, to persuasion and argument, to dealmaking
in which each party seeks its own advantage.
Between the extraconstitutional extremes of force and talk, the national
government has at its disposal at least three constitutionally authorized
methods of influencing state behavior. First, and least intrusively, the na-
tional government can use its spending power to offer states financial
rewards for engaging in behavior that the national government wishes to
induce or for refraining from behavior that it wishes to discourage.46 For
example, Congress has on numerous occasions used the federal highway
funding system to induce states to enact legislation that Congress thought
desirable by conditioning the distribution of federal funds on the state's
enactment of the desired legislation. These conditions have included adjust-
ing the state speed limit to conform to national guidelines,47 raising the state
drinking age to twenty-one, 48 requiring drivers to wear seat belts, 49 and
lowering the blood alcohol level required for a drunk driving conviction
under state law.50
A second, and considerably more intrusive, mechanism for restraining
44. See, e.g., Stanley Meiser, Bush Asks Governors for New Direction for Schools, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
28, 1989, at 28.
45. These contacts have become so frequent and popular that formal legal authorization for them is
sometimes expressly provided. For example, the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act formally
authorizes federal agencies to engage in regulatory negotiation ("reg-neg") with parties, including
states, interested in the outcome of the regulatory process. 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70 (2000); see 5 U.S.C.
§ 562(9) (2000) (defining by reference to 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) the "persons" who may engage in the
regulatory negotiation process to include a "public... organization").
46. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (upholding a federal statute instructing
the Secretary of Transportation to withhold a portion of federal highway funds from states that failed to
enact a minimum drinking age of 21 years).
47. From 1975 to 1995, Congress conditioned receipt of certain highway funds on states maintaining
a maximum speed limit of 55 miles per hour. See Federal-Aid Highway Amendments of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-643, § 114, 88 Stat. 2281, 2286 (1975) as amended by Surface Transportation Assistance Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-599, § 205, 92 Stat. 2689, 2729 (1978) and repealed by National Highway System
Designation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-59, § 205(d), 109 Stat. 568, 577.
48. 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2000) (requiring minimum drinking age of 21).
49. Id. § 153 (2000) (requiring use of safety belts and motorcycle helmets).
50. Id. § 161 (2000) (requiring a blood alcohol level of .02 for a DWI violation for anyone under the
age of 21 operating a motor vehicle); 23 U.S.C. § 163 (2000) (requiring a blood alcohol level of .08 for
a DWI violation for all other motor vehicle operators); see also 23 U.S.C. § 154 (2000) (requiring states
to have a law banning open containers of alcoholic beverages in vehicles located on public highways).
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state power is the displacement of state law through the national power of
preemption. Under the Supremacy Clause, 5' valid national legislation auto-
matically displaces and invalidates inconsistent state law, from the lowliest
administrative regulation to the most exalted state constitutional provision.
The power to preempt state law allows Congress not only to enact national
legislation that it believes promotes the public good, but simultaneously to
invalidate state laws and programs which, in the opinion of Congress, either
are harmful to the public good or do not promote it as efficaciously as the
national program.5 2
Yet another mechanism that the national government uses to restrain states
from using their powers in harmful ways is judicial invalidation of state law
under the national Constitution. By invoking the power of judicial review,
national courts may strike down state laws or invalidate state actions that violate
provisions of the United States Constitution that apply to the states, and may
issue orders forbidding state officials from repeating such violations in the
future.5 3 Aside from judicial enforcement of preemptive federal law, the most
common circumstance in which national courts strike down state law is when
the state law violates an individual right protected by the Equal Protection or
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, federal courts
charged with enforcing national constitutional rights against the states have on
numerous occasions invalidated state laws or actions that infringe upon nation-
ally-guaranteed freedoms of speech or religion, that discriminate on the basis of
race or gender, or that violate restrictions governing the investigation, arrest,
detention, or trial of criminal suspects.54 In a well-known remark, Justice Oliver
51. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, supra note 4.
52. For example, when Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Program
(ERISA) in 1974, it stated explicitly, in laying out its statutory findings, that its reasons for
enacting the statute included "the inadequacy of current minimum standards" under state law
governing the soundness and stability of employee benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000); see
also NORMAN J. SINGER, 2 STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 44A:5, at 707 (1991) ("The
reason for ERISA is that before ERISA the regulation of plans-both federal and state-was
fragmentary and weak."). ERISA contains an explicit preemption provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a),
that courts have construed to be extremely broad in scope. See N.Y. State Conference v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739
(1985).
53. One of the earliest and most significant examples of national courts' authority to invalidate state
laws is McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 329-30 (1819) (invalidating state tax on
national bank).
54. This has become so commonplace that it is routine. For some significant examples, see Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (invalidating state law that barred only males aged 18-20 and not
females of like age from purchasing 3.2% beer); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-35 (1972)
(invalidating state law requiring compulsory public education without any exception for alternative
religious education); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969) (invalidating state law prohibiting
speech that advocates violence as a means of social reform); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495
(1954) (invalidating de jure racial segregation of state public schools); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 173 (1952) (reversing state conviction obtained using evidence that had been pumped from the
defendant's stomach without his consent).
[Vol. 91:10031014
2003] STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AS RESISTANCE TO NATIONAL POWER 1015
Wendell Holmes claimed that this kind of judicial review is of the utmost
importance to the proper working of the federal scheme: "I do not think the
United States would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of
Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make
that declaration as to the laws of the several States."55
2. How State Governments Protect Liberty
In the American federal system, state governments protect the liberty of the
citizenry in much the same way as the national government, although of course
the influence of any individual state will be felt for the most part only within its
own geographical territory and predominantly by its own citizens. First, like the
national government, state governments possess significant powers that they can
use affirmatively to pursue the public good. Indeed, the scope of state power
tends to be (although it need not be) broader than the scope of national power,
reaching many areas of ordinary life that the national government is usually
understood to lack the power to regulate. 56 For example, state law overwhelm-
ingly provides the controlling substantive rules in the laws of torts, contracts,
commercial transactions, crimes, property, wills, and family formation. Al-
though the national government has made limited forays into all of these areas,
they are most often understood to be beyond the national government's power
to regulate to any great degree.57 Thus, states have extensive resources to
achieve or promote the public good directly through the exercise of affirma-
tively granted powers.
Second, state governments, like the national government, protect the liberty
of their citizens by exercising a constitutionally imposed self-restraint by which
the state government protects its own citizens from itself. Like the national
government, every state government has horizontally divided powers. 58 Every
state has its own bill of rights. Every state has an independent judicial branch
authorized to enforce against the other branches those provisions of the state
constitution that limit state power. These restrictions are intended to make the
state government less dangerous to its own people.
The degree to which a state polity chooses to restrain its own state govern-
ment is, moreover, entirely independent of the level of restraint that the national
55. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 (1920).
56. Unlike the national government, which is one of limited and enumerated powers, state govern-
ments are typically said to be governments of general power. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE
AMERICAN UNION 87 (1868); G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTIrUTIONS 7-8 (1998).
57. This is especially the case after United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), in which the Court
curbed congressional use of the commerce power for the attainment of noneconomic goals.
58. See TARR, supra note 56, at 14 (explaining that "forty state constitutions expressly mandate a
separation of powers" while in other states, separation is treated as "implicit in the constitutional
design"); ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 649-871 (3d ed. 1999) (collecting cases and
materials on horizontal separation of powers under state constitutions).
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polity has imposed upon the national government. 59 The people of a state are
free to subject their government to more or fewer restrictions than the national
constitution imposes on the national government. They may do so, for example,
by constructing a system of separation of powers that is stricter or looser than
the national model.6 ° Or they may create a state bill of rights that establishes a
more or less extensive set of rights that restricts the scope of state power to a
greater or lesser degree than the U.S. Bill of Rights restricts the national
government.61 Or they may adjust the powers of judicial review held by state
62courts, or give state judges greater or lesser independence from the other
branches than federal judges possess under the national Constitution.63 In all
these cases, states are completely free to make independent determinations
concerning the degree to which the state government must practice self-
restraint. 64
59. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (holding that states may exceed
the level of protection for individual rights set by the Fourteenth Amendment of U.S. Constitution).
60. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederal Separation of
Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1190-1201 (1999) (analyzing a different treatment
of the nondelegation doctrine, an aspect of the horizontal separation of powers, in state constitutional
law).
61. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 489, 495-502 (1977); Barry Latzer, Four Half-Truths About State Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP.
L. REV. 1123, 1128-30, 1140 (1992).
62. For example, many state constitutions provide looser standing rules than does the U.S. Constitu-
tion, making it easier for litigants to get into court to challenge state laws or actions. Thus, where the
U.S. Constitution denies standing to people merely on the basis of their status as taxpayers, Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 509-10 (1975), many state constitutions follow a more liberal rule of standing.
See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. 9, § 32 (explicitly granting taxpayers standing); Nuckols v. Lyle, 70 P. 401,
401 (Idaho 1902) (interpreting state judicial power to extend to claims raised by taxpayers).
63. For example, some state judges are independently elected, bypassing any need for legislative
confirmation. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 33 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 137-39 (2000-01).
Some state courts have independent rulemaking authority of a type that federal courts do not possess.
See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 58, at 702-18 (providing examples of state courts exerting their
rulemaking authority); Jeffrey A. Parness, Public Process and State-Court Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J.
1319, 1320-22 (1979) (examining the scope of judicial rulemaking powers in various states). In some
instances, state courts even have some binding authority to set their own budgetary allocations. See
Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193, 197 (Pa. 1971).
64. A few provisions of the U.S. Constitution may restrict a state's freedom to structure its own
government in some ways, but this influence is mostly theoretical, extremely limited at best, and
probably nil in practice. For example, the Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution, U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government"), requires states to have republican governments. This is probably a very minor require-
ment, easily satisfied by every state constitution. It is also very likely a moot requirement because the
U.S. Supreme Court has generally refused to adjudicate questions of state government structure under
the Guarantee Clause on the grounds that such questions are inherently political and therefore not
amenable to judicial decision. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946); Pac. Tel. Co. v.
Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 142-43 (1912); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849). Congress has
never shown much interest in taking up such questions, and it is difficult to imagine Congress ever
generating any particular enthusiasm for such a project. The U.S. Constitution also contains a provision
barring states from creating hereditary titles, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. I ("No State shall ... grant any
Title of Nobility"), apparently intended to prevent states from establishing monarchical or aristocratic
forms of government. Not surprisingly, no state has ever shown such an inclination. Various other
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Finally, in a mirror image of the national function, state governments protect
liberty by restraining the national government from undertaking actions that
state officials or the state polity believe to be tyrannical or otherwise harmful to
the public good. The symmetry between national and state roles in this federal
function, however, is limited. Unlike the national government, which has
numerous, directly authorized legal means at its disposal for checking abusive
exercises of state power, state governments, because they are subject to the
Supremacy Clause, have fewer obviously legal avenues of redress to check or
impede exercises of national power that they consider detrimental to the public
welfare.
a. Illegal and Quasi-legal Means for Checking National Power Like the
national government, state governments have at their disposal certain illegal, or
at least extraconstitutional, methods for checking abusive exercises of federal
power. The most potent of these options is the use of force,65 and the most
dramatic use of state force to resist national power is undoubtedly the act of
secession. Although the threat of state secession has not played a significant role
in American politics since the Civil War, it has played an extremely potent role
in many federal nations around the globe in the last few decades, including
Canada, the former Yugoslavia, and the former Soviet Union. The contemporary
relevance of secession in global politics, often accompanied by extreme vio-
lence, suggests that its lack of relevance in the United States ought to be treated
more as a fortunate historical contingency than as evidence that secession is
structurally irrelevant to American intergovernmental relations.66
The use of force is not, of course, limited to outright secession: states may
employ force by threatening or engaging in limited armed resistance short of
secession. Although it occurred against a backdrop of threatened secession, the
Nullification Crisis may serve as an example of this more limited kind of resort
provisions of the national Constitution refer to state legislatures, executives, and judges. E.g., U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. I ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof"); art. IV, § 4 ("The United
States shall ... protect [the States] against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the
Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence"); art. VI, cl. 3 ("[T]he
Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers . . . shall be bound by
Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution"). These provisions suggest that the national Constitu-
tion contemplates at least a minimal separation of powers in the structure of every state government.
Again, no state government is structured in a way as to raise the slightest hint of impropriety under
these clauses, even if the federal courts were to show any inclination to enforce them, which seems
doubtful in light of their approach to the Guarantee Clause.
65. Amar, supra note 21, at 501-03.
66. One fortuitous factor that may account for the relative peacefulness of contemporary American
federalism is the lack of a genuine homegrown ethnic nationalism. American nationalism tends to be
ideological and inclusive rather than ethnic and exclusive. See, e.g., WALKER CONNOR, ETHNONATIONAL-
ISM: THE QUEST FOR UNDERSTANDING 95 (1994); HANS KOHN, AMERICAN NATIONALISM: AN INTERPRETIVE
ESSAY 8-9 (1957).
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to force.6 7 In 1832, the national government enacted a protectionist tariff that
many Southerners felt benefited northern industrial interests at the expense of
the southern economic interest in agricultural exports. The tariff caused an
especially strong political reaction in South Carolina. Among the many steps it
took to resist the tariff, South Carolina raised a small army, which it threatened
to deploy to block any effort by national customs officials to collect the tariff in
the port of Charleston. The U.S. government responded by preparing for
possible military action to enforce the tariff law. The national government
eventually defused the threat of violence when it took careful steps to avoid
any outright provocation, and South Carolina ultimately backed down from
its threat to use force. Nevertheless, shortly after resolution of the crisis,
Congress in 1834 enacted the Compromise Tariff, which phased out over a
nine-year period the provisions to which South Carolinians objected. Al-
though South Carolina was not able to obtain precisely what it wanted as
quickly as it wanted, its threatened use of force influenced the content of
national law.
Another more recent example of a state's threatened use of force is Arkan-
sas's 1957 saber-rattling in response to national efforts to implement a federal
judicial order requiring the desegregation of Central High School in Little Rock,
the state capital. Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus, vowing to resist federal
enforcement of the desegregation order, deployed the National Guard at the
school to forcibly prevent the student plaintiffs from entering the building.68 As
a confrontation brewed, the governor withdrew the troops, leaving the students
to face a white mob. President Eisenhower then sent in one thousand troops
from the 101st Airborne Division, a regular United States military unit, to
enforce the court order and keep the peace. 69 As in the Nullification Crisis, a
direct, armed conflict between state and national military forces never
materialized, although the threat of such a conflict was taken seriously by all
sides.
Even more recently, states have threatened physical confrontation with the
national government over issues of environmental policy. Prompted largely by
national legislation that restricted grazing on public lands, legislatures in several
western states contemplated legislation in the late 1970s and early 1980s that
would have declared nationally-owned lands to be the property of the state in
which the land was located. 70 In 1979, Nevada went so far as to enact legisla-
tion "declaring state sovereignty over 49 million acres of Nevada territory"
owned by the national government and managed by the Bureau of Land
67. The account here follows WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE NULLIFICATION
CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1816-1836, at chs. 4-10 (1966).
68. See BRANCH, supra note 43, at 222.
69. Id. at 224.
70. For an overview of this "Sagebrush Rebellion," see R. McGREGGOR CAWLEY, FEDERAL LAND,
WESTERN ANGER: THE SAGEBRUSH REBELLION AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 109-10 (1993); WILLIAM L.
GRAF, WILDERNESS PRESERVATION AND THE SAGEBRUSH REBELLIONS 225-32 (1990).
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Management. 71 Although this so-called "Sagebrush Rebellion" never led to
organized violence against the national government by any state,72 a more
serious incident occurred in 1988 when Idaho Governor Cecil Andrus
deployed state police to seize at the state border a railway shipment of
radioactive waste generated at a federal nuclear facility in Colorado.73
Andrus had the shipment seized pursuant to a state-declared policy of
refusing to accept additional nuclear waste from out-of-state. As recently as
last year, the Governor of South Carolina made a similar threat to block at
the border trucks containing weapons-grade plutonium destined for a federal
storage site in the state.74
States determined to defy national law need not, of course, do so through
violence or the threat of violence. Defiance can be accomplished by more
peaceful means and, indeed, examples of such peaceful illegal defiance are as
abundant as examples of the violent variety are rare. Once again, state resis-
tance to the national enforcement of the rights of African-Americans furnishes
numerous instances, particularly in the area of political rights. The Fifteenth
Amendment prohibits states from denying the right to vote on account of race,7 5
yet many states during the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries
adopted "grandfather clauses," which sought to disenfranchise black citizens by
granting the right to vote only to citizens whose ancestors enjoyed that right.
States also engaged in numerous actions designed to avoid registering black
71. PAUL WALLACE GATES, PRESSURE GROUPS AND RECENT AMERICAN LAND POLICIES 3 (1980); see also
"Sagebrush Rebels" Are Reveling in Reagan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1980, at D9 (reporting that the
legislatures of Nevada, Utah, Arizona, and Wyoming had passed resolutions "laying claim to Federal
lands within their boundaries").
72. It did, however, lead to organized violence by at least one county government. In 1995, Nye
County, Nevada, a sparsely populated but geographically immense jurisdiction, declared its ownership
over thousands of square miles of federal land within its borders, a claim that it made good when it
bulldozed a trail through a closed area of the Toiyabe National Forest and when it threatened to arrest
federal parks officials for trespassing. See Gary Andrew Poole, Hold It! This Land Is My Land!, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 1995, Magazine, at 28. The federal government declined to respond with force, however,
resorting instead to judicial proceedings in which a federal district court affirmed the obvious fact of
federal ownership over the "disputed" territory. United States v. Nye County, 920 F. Supp. 1108 (D.
Nev. 1996); see also United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314 (9th Cir. 1997) (also holding that U.S.
government holds title to public lands within Nevada).
73. Fox Butterfield, Idaho Firm on Barring Atomic Waste, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1988, § 1, at 32.
74. David Firestone, S. Carolina Battles U.S. on Plutonium, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 2002, at A22.
Governor Hodges initially backed away from his threats, instead resorting to a lawsuit to block the
shipments of plutonium. Amy Geier, S.C. Governor Sues Energy Dept., ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 2,
2002, available at 2002 WL 20248094. When a federal court ruled against him, Governor Hodges
declared a state of emergency and deployed state police to block any plutonium shipments. Matthew
Boedy, Governor Declares State of Emergency, AUGUSTA CHRON., June 15, 2002, at Al. He later
relented and complied with the court order. Judge Blocks Effort to Bar Plutonium, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,
2002, at A2 1. All legal issues were finally resolved in favor of the United States in Hodges v. Abraham,
300 F.3d 432 (4th Cir. 2002).
75. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § I ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude.").
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voters.76 Similarly, in a notorious string of equal protection cases known as the
White Primary Cases, Texas political officials continued to disenfranchise
blacks first by making them ineligible to vote in Democratic primaries, and then
by constructing sham parties and "private political clubs" that did the real work
of nominating Democratic candidates and excluded blacks.7 7
There is little question but that the Framers of the U.S. Constitution fully
expected states to express their disapproval of national policies through pre-
cisely this kind of outright defiance of national law, including resort to threats of
force. This was, after all, the model of decentralized resistance to tyrannical
central power that the Framers knew best-the model of the Revolution itself.
Madison, for example, acknowledged this directly:
[S]hould an unwarrantable measure of the federal government be unpopular in
particular States, which would seldom fail to be the case, or even a warrant-
able measure be so, which may sometimes be the case, the means of opposi-
tion to it are powerful and at hand. The disquietude of the people; their
repugnance and, perhaps, refusal to cooperate with the officers of the Union;
the frowns of the executive magistracy of the State; the embarrassments
created by legislative devices, which would often be added on such occasions,
would oppose, in any State, difficulties not to be despised; would form, in a
large State, very serious impediments; and where the sentiments of several
adjoining States happened to be in unison, would present obstructions which
the federal government would hardly be willing to encounter.
78
Although Madison was reluctant to paint a picture of state resistance to national
power that crossed the line from mere denunciation and uncooperative defiance
to violence, 79 Hamilton, characteristically, was not so squeamish:
76. See, e.g., Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 363-67 (1915) (describing Oklahoma literacy
test, which required descendants of anyone who was not allowed to vote in 1866 to be able to "read and
write any section of the [state] constitution" as a precondition to voter registration).
77. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 462-63 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 651 (1944).
State defiance of national power on racial issues has not always been for the purpose of avoiding
national principles of racial justice: Before the Civil War, judges in northern states sometimes defied
national law concerning the return of fugitive slaves. See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED:
ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975). Other acts of defiance have included, for example,
post-Lochner enactment of wage and hour laws, and post-Roe enactment of abortion prohibitions, often
as deliberate test cases. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 416-18 (1908) (maximum hours law
for women engaged in factory or laundry work); Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 433-36 (1917)
(maximum hour and overtime pay law for factory workers); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525,
539-42 (1923) (minimum wage law for women); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 56 (1976) (spousal consent requirement for abortion); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 419-25 (1983) (requirement that abortions be performed in a hospital);
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 750-52 (1986) (detailed
regulation of abortion procedures); Steinberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921-22 (2000) (ban on partial
birth abortions).
78. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, 319-20 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
79. Later in The Federalist No. 46, Madison goes so far as to compare the size of armed forces that
could be raised by the state and national governments, but thought that loud public criticism of the
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It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system, that the State
governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security
against invasions of the public liberty by the national authority. Projects of
usurpation cannot be masked under pretences so likely to escape the penetra-
tion of select bodies of men, as of the people at large. The legislatures will
have better means of information. They can discover the danger at a distance;
and possessing all the organs of civil power, and the confidence of the people,
they can at once adopt a regular plan of opposition, in which they can
combine all the resources of the community. They can readily communicate
with each other in the different States, and unite their common forces for the
protection of their common liberty.
... If the federal army should be able to quell the resistance of one State,
the distant States would have it in their power to make head with fresh forces.
The advantages obtained in one place must be abandoned to subdue the
opposition in others; and the moment the part which had been reduced to
submission was left to itself, its efforts would be renewed, and its resistance
revive.80
In addition to these outright illegal means of resisting national power, states
also have at their disposal a number of what might be termed "quasi-legal"
strategies for thwarting uses of national power that they consider inimical to the
public good. One such strategy is deliberate failure fully to comply with or to
enforce binding federal law. Here, the state does not defy national law, but
nevertheless attempts, in the guise of implementing it, to undermine it with
half-hearted or inappropriate measures. For example, in 1975, as part of an
energy policy designed to conserve oil, Congress lowered the speed limit on all
roads to fifty-five miles per hour.8' Most states responded by complying with
the new speed limit; they issued speeding tickets as usual to drivers who
exceeded this new speed limit and levied their usual fines for violations.
Montana, however, complied in an extremely half-hearted way. Instead of
treating violations of the fifty-five-mile-per-hour speed limit as traffic infrac-
tions, it issued five-dollar "environmental" citations to drivers traveling above
fifty-five miles per hour, but below what Montana police considered a safe
speed. 82 Violations were not charged against drivers' insurance records. This
national government would generally suffice, as subsequently evidenced by his authorship of the
Virginia Resolution, in which he criticized the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 and pronounced them
unconstitutional. See generally Wayne D. Moore, Reconceiving Interpretive Autonomy: Insights from
the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 315 (1994) (giving an account of the
drafting and reception of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions).
80. THE FEDERALIST, No. 28, 179-80 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
81. Federal-Aid Highway Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-643, § 114, 88 Stat. 2281, 2286
(1975).
82. According to news accounts, the "conventional wisdom" was that no serious infractions would
be charged for daytime driving below about eighty-five miles per hour in good weather conditions. Tom
Kenworthy, New Life in the Fast Lane: Wide-Open Throttles in Wide Open Spaces, WASH. POST, Dec. 9,
1995, at A3.
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kind of "enforcement" worked to undermine the congressional objective since it
both declared quite plainly the state's continuing opposition to the national
policy, and all but invited the public to exceed the national speed limit with
impunity within the borders of the state-an invitation that drivers, predictably,
took up with enthusiasm. 83
A similar kind of state response is to engage in deliberate foot-dragging on
national initiatives that require the cooperation of state officials. A good ex-
ample of this process is the continuing failure of states to comply with federal
environmental laws requiring states to address the problem of "nonpoint source"
water pollution. The federal Clean Water Act 84 divides the sources of water
pollution into two types: point sources and nonpoint sources. A point source is a
discrete and identifiable "conveyance," such as a drainpipe, ditch, or seagoing
vessel, that discharges pollutants into the water.85 Nonpoint source pollution, in
contrast, refers to pollutants that enter waters from widely diffused or not
clearly identifiable sources, typically as the result of rainfall runoff, snowmelt,
or agricultural irrigation.86 Of the two, nonpoint source pollution is by far the
more serious problem nationally for water quality.
87
The Clean Water Act deals with the problem of point source pollution by
delegating to the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the primary
responsibility for setting standards and issuing permits for point sources. How-
ever, Congress decided to leave the larger problem of nonpoint source pollution
to the states. Under Section 319 of the Act, "The Governor of each State...
shall ... prepare and submit to the Administrator [of the EPA] for approval a
management program which such State proposes to implement ... for control-
ling pollution added from nonpoint sources to the navigable waters within the
,,88 AcState and improving the quality of such waters. The Act goes on to provide
specifications for the content of any state management program, deadlines for
state compliance, and compliance incentives that include grants of federal funds
and the provision by the national government of technical support.89
State cooperation with the Clean Water Act's nonpoint source management
program has been inconsistent. A summary report prepared by the EPA in 1992
found, for example, that few states had included in their management plan
programs addressing nonpoint source pollution of wetlands. 90 Several states had
83. Robert E. King & Cass R. Sunstein, Doing Without Speed Limits, 79 B.U. L. REv. 155, 157-62
(1999); Timothy Egan, Speeding Is Easy (and Almost Free) in Montana, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1989, at
A14.
84. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
85. Id. at § 1362(14).
86. See Notice of Availability and Request for Comment, SECTION 319 FEDERAL CONSISTENCY
GUIDANCE, 63 Fed. Reg. 45504-05 (Aug. 26, 1998).
87. Daniel R. Mandelker, Controlling Nonpoint Source Water Pollution: Can It Be Done?, 65
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479, 480-81 (1989).
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (b)(1).
89. Id. at §§ 1329 (b)(2), (c)(2), (e), (f), and (h).
90. U.S. EPA, MANAGING NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION 32 (1992).
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failed altogether to develop satisfactory plans long after the initial congressional
deadline passed. Others complained that full compliance was impossible until
the EPA provided better empirical monitoring data.9' In the years following
enactment of Section 319, some state governments evidently devoted more
energy to finding ways to avoid implementing the Act's mandate than they
devoted to compliance. As a result, little substantive progress has been made
nationally in dealing with the environmental hazards of polluted runoff.
Madison predicted in The Federalist that the national government would
require the assistance and cooperation of the states to accomplish its more
ambitious goals.92 Environmental regulation seems to be one area in which
Madison has been proven correct. In consequence, the refusal of states to
provide the needed cooperation can be an effective means of thwarting the
national government's achievement of its objectives. Where such cooperation is
withheld because of a state's belief that the program for which state cooperation
is sought is an abuse of national power, withholding cooperation is also a way
for states to protect the liberty of the nation's citizens.93
b. Legal Means for Checking National Power In addition to the illegal and
quasi-legal methods discussed above, states have at least four fully legal
avenues of recourse to thwart exercises of national power: (1) the use of
political pressure, (2) the exercise of ordinary state power where it is not
preempted, (3) refusal of national financial incentives, and (4) lawsuits against
the national government in federal court. It is the purpose of this Article to add
to this list a fifth method: granting more generous state constitutional rights.
Discussion of this last method is deferred to Part II.B. The present discussion
provides context by focusing on the four methods listed above.
Much has been written about the ways in which the states may influence
national legislation through political means. 94 State officials often have the
capacity, for example, to press the state's congressional delegation to work for
the enactment at the national level of policies favored by the state.95 For a
91. Id. at 43.
92. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 311 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
93. See Jeffrey S. Hill & Carol S. Weissert, Implementation and the Irony of Delegation: The
Politics of Low-Level Waste Disposal, 57 J. POL. 344 (1995) (arguing that states have structural
incentives to use delay as a form of strategic noncompliance while hoping for an intervening change of
federal policy).
94. Among the classic works written about the way in which states may influence national
legislation through political means are JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS (1980); and Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
95. Under the original Constitution, state legislatures had considerable leverage over U.S. Senators
because they elected them. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. After the Seventeenth Amendment instituted
direct popular senatorial elections, states pursued a variety of less reliable, but still effective means of
influencing national political actors. In addition to informal cooperation among state officials and
members of Congress from their states, each state maintains a Washington lobbying office on Capitol
Hill in the aptly named Hall of the States on North Capitol Street. State officials have also formed
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decade, this view of state influence induced the U.S. Supreme Court to abandon
any attempt to enforce constitutional limits on the national commerce power, a
position from which it has since retreated.96 In an important recent study, Larry
Kramer has suggested that political negotiation coordinated under the auspices
of the national political parties has evolved into the single most important
mechanism by which states influence the behavior of national officials. 97 Through
such means, state officials may head off legislation of which they disapprove
before it is enacted, or obtain modifications of proposed national policies that
eliminate or moderate provisions to which they object.
Another way in which states may check federal abuses is by using their
ordinary affirmative powers when they are not preempted from doing so. Power
can be tyrannical not only when it is used affirmatively for tyrannical ends, but
also when it is withheld in circumstances that either perpetuate an unjust status
quo or passively permit some individuals to behave unjustly toward others.
When national power is invoked affirmatively in abusive ways, it nonetheless
preempts contrary exercises of state power. In contrast, when national power is
abusively withheld rather than invoked, states are often free to take corrective
action.98 For example, state legislatures may use their affirmative powers to
create state-level programs to address wrongs that the national government
refuses to redress. 99 State legislatures and courts may also create liability rules
numerous organizations that lobby Congress formally on an institutional rather than state-by-state basis.
These include the National Governors' Association, the National Council of State Legislatures, and the
National Association of Attorneys General. For a discussion of the lobbying role and efforts of these
and other similar groups, see ANNE MARIE CAMMISA, GOVERNMENTS AS INTEREST GROUPS: INTERGOVERNMEN-
TAL LOBBYING AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1995); DONALD H. HADIER, WHEN GOVERNMENTS COME TO
WASHINGTON: GOVERNORS, MAYORS, AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL LOBBYING (1974); John Dinan, State
Government Influence in the National Policy Process: Lessons from the 104th Congress, 27 PUBLIUS
129 (1997).
96. Compare Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transp. Auth., 469 U.S. 70, 79-80 (1985), with Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 899-900 (1997), and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166
(1992). See also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551, 556-57 (1995).
97. Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM.
L. REV. 215, 278-82 (2000).
98. In some limited circumstances, even the national government's decision not to invoke its powers
may have preemptive effect. The most notable example is the Dormant Commerce Clause, in which the
U.S. Constitution prevents states from regulating certain kinds of interstate economic relations when
Congress itself has declined to do so.
99. It is entirely subjective, of course, what specifically constitutes a wrong that the national
government refuses to address, but partisans of all stripes can easily find their favorites. One of the
most significant areas of state activity in which the national government has been inactive is that of gay
and lesbian rights. Congress has refused thus far to extend the proscriptions of national civil rights law
to discrimination based on sexual orientation, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000) (Title VII list of
unlawful employment practices limited to discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and
national origin), and has even enacted legislation purporting to authorize states to refuse to grant full
faith and credit to gay marriages that are valid in other states, see Defense of Marriage Act, 110 Stat.
2419 (1996), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000). Many states, by contrast, have enacted legislation
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation in employment, education, and housing, or have
extended the statutory definition of hate crimes to include those committed because of the victim's
sexual orientation. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81c (West 2002) (employment); MD. ANN.
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that allow individuals who are victimized by unjust private behavior to obtain
injunctions against such behavior or to recover compensation for the harms it
causes.' 00 Individual states may even coordinate informally"0 ' with one another
to create regional coalitions dedicated to correcting national omissions that rise
to the level of abuses of national power. 
10 2
Even where the national government has exercised its power, however, states
often are not deprived entirely of the means to ameliorate what they perceive to
be negative influences of that power on the state's citizenry. As the Framers
anticipated, the successful invocation of national power sometimes requires the
cooperation of state officials. 0 3 In recognition of this requirement of intergovern-
mental cooperation, Congress has frequently structured national programs so as
to delegate to state officials a crucial role-the implementation and enforcement
of the programs. All of the largest and most costly nonmilitary domestic
national programs-social security, welfare, food stamps, and so on-delegate
much of the responsibility for the day-to-day operation of the programs to the
states. 1°4 State responsibility for these programs may include setting eligibility
requirements, determining benefit levels, or enforcing compliance with program-
matic requirements, functions that require the exercise of a significant amount
CODE art. 49B, § 22 (2002) (housing); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 76, § 5 (West 2002) (education); NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-111 (Michie 2002) (hate crime); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 281.370 (Michie 2002)
(employment); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:10 (1995) (housing); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.00
(McKinney 2002) (hate crime); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 36.12 (West 2002) (education).
Another example is needle exchange programs. Although the national government has declined to
sponsor such a program, several states have authorized them. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 11364.7 (West 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-124 (West 2002); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 325-112 (Michie 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-2C-4 (Michie 2002).
A third example is legal protection for persons with disabilities whose disabilities can be diminished
by medication or corrective devices. After the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the federal Americans
with Disabilities Act, 104 Stat. 328 (1990), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000), did not apply to such
persons unless they were still substantially limited in one or more major life activities when employing
corrective measures, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), Rhode Island enacted a
statute extending protection against discrimination in the workplace to those with such correctable
disabilities. R.I. GEN. LAWS § I l-24-2. l (a)(l)(ii) (Supp. 200 1).
100. This is, of course, the classic function of tort law.
101. Under the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution, formal coordination among states
requires the approval of Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. Presumably, such approval would not
be forthcoming if the states' objective was to thwart what they considered Congress's abusive failure to
address a pressing problem.
102. For example, the Council of Great Lakes Governors is an informal partnership of the governors
of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, as well
as the premiers of Ontario and Quebec. The organization's primary task is to facilitate policy
coordination among the Great Lakes states concerning issues of environmental quality and
economic growth. See generally Council of Great Lake Governors, at http://www.cglg.org (last
visited Aug. 26, 2003).
103. THE FEDERALIST No. 27, at 174-75 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
104. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-04 (2000) (providing federal grants to states for welfare programs
and delegating to states substantial discretion as to how to meet programmatic goals); id. §§ 1397-
1397a (2000) (establishing federal social security block grants and setting out goals that states should
meet when administering grants).
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 91:1003
of official discretion. 10 5
When the national government grants states this kind of significant responsi-
bility for implementing national initiatives, it often does so by establishing
parameters that define the outer boundaries of state discretion. 0 6 Nevertheless,
within these boundaries, state officials often have room to bend their implemen-
tation of national policy in ways that also serve state interests, even when those
interests are opposed to successful implementation of the national program.1
0 7
For example, if state officials think a national program is contrary to the public
good, they might set eligibility requirements as restrictively as possible to
minimize the scope and impact of the program.'0 8 Conversely, if they believe
some national program is insufficient in scale to combat effectively some unjust
feature of the status quo, and they are preempted from developing an indepen-
dent state program of sufficient magnitude, they may be able to set eligibility
requirements and benefit levels within the national program much more expan-
sively than the national government requires. 0 9 Thus, states may prevent what
105. See generally EUGENE BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER A BILL
BECOMES A LAW (1977) (describing the process of state implementation of federal programs). Bardach
calls policy implementation "the continuation of politics by other means." Id. at 85.
106. For example, in 1987 the federal Medicaid program permitted states the option of covering
thirty-two different kinds of medical services beyond the required minimum, ranging from services
provided by optometrists, to podiatrists, to Christian Science nurses. Saundra K. Schneider & William
G. Jacoby, Influences on Bureaucratic Policy Initiatives in the American States, 6 J. OF PUB. ADMIN. RES.
& THEORY 495, 502 (1996).
107. According to one study:
Washington has had, and continues to have, tremendous difficulty in executing even relatively
straightforward policies precisely because state and local governments enjoy such wide
latitude in deciding how best to translate federal policies into action, or whether, in fact, to
follow federal policies at all. The empirical evidence on this point is simply overwhelming.
JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR. & DONALD F. KETTL, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, FINE PRINT: THE CONTRACT WITH
AMERICA, DEVOLUTION, AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE REALITIES OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 18 (1995).
108. For example, in exercising their discretion to set eligibility requirements for federal welfare
programs, midwestern and southern states "took a harder line [than federal parameters required],
reflecting a tougher work ethic." LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY: THE NONWORKING
POOR IN AMERICA 191 (1992). About half the states have exercised federally delegated discretion to
exclude from the federal food stamp program persons convicted of a drug felony. Herman Schwartz, A
Prohibition That Frustrates the People's Will, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 2001, at M2. A classic example of
how this process works is the local subversion of federal housing initiatives described in MARTHA
DERTHICK, NEW TOWNS IN-TOWN: WHY A FEDERAL PROGRAM FAILED (1972).
109. For example, in 1984 the federal government required states participating in the Social Security
Insurance (SSI) program to pay a minimum benefit level of $325 per month, Only seven states set
benefits at that level; Alaska set benefits at nearly double the minimum at $586 per month. Martha
Derthick, American Federalism: Madison 's Middle Ground in the 1980s, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66, 68
(1987). As of June 25, 1998, Alaska pays monthly benefits of $1,025 under the Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families program (the successor to the former welfare program, Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC)), nine times the benefit level paid by Alabama. See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Services, Selected Provisions of State TANF Plans-Part l-(as of June 25, 1998), at http://
www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/ofa/tanft9 la.htm (last modified June 1, 2000).
The scope of federal programs can be expanded in many other ways. For example, several states
resisted the Reagan Administration's efforts to cut back on enforcement of the Occupational Health and
Safety Act (OSHA). During the period when the federal government gave states more authority to
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they perceive as public harm at the hands of the national government by doing
good on the state level.
Not all methods of state resistance to abuses of national power are so
complex. For example, when the national government uses its spending power
rather than its commerce power to enact nationwide programs, it induces states
to participate in its programs by conditioning financial rewards on state participa-
tion and compliance. In these situations, states may resist abuses of national
power by simply refusing the financial incentives.°"0 Although it is much more
common for states to accept than to reject conditioned national funds,'" states
have occasionally sacrificed such funds for the sake of rejecting policies that
they viewed as inimical to the public good. For example, New Hampshire has
refused repeatedly to enact a mandatory seatbelt law, thereby forgoing a portion
of its allocation of federal highway maintenance and construction funds." 
2
Nevada and Wisconsin have sacrificed federal highway funds by refusing to
lower their statutory threshold for drunk driving convictions to a blood alcohol
level of 0.08 percent, in defiance of federal law requiring the adjustment.'
Kentucky recently abolished state vehicle emission standards, threatening its
ability to meet federally mandated pollution limits, which could lead to the loss
of nearly two billion dollars in federal highway funds.' 14
Yet another way in which states can check abuses of power by the national
legislative and executive branches is by invoking the power of the national
judicial branch against them.' 15 States have often successfully sued the federal
government in federal court over alleged abuses of national authority. In 1992,
for example, New York successfully sued the United States in federal court and
obtained a ruling that invalidated a portion of the federal Low-Level Radioac-
determine enforcement levels and provided incentives to reduce enforcement against industry, at least
six states used their delegated authority to increase inspections, compliance officers, and overall
enforcement. Frank J. Thompson & Michael J. Scicchitano, OSHA, the States, and Gresham 's Law:
From Carter to Reagan, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY 95, 101-02 (J. Edwin
Benton & David R. Morgan eds., 1986); see also GLENN BEAMER, CREATIVE POLITICS: TAXES AND PUBLIC
GOODS IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 5, 123-25, 130-31 (1999) (describing how legislators in some states
manipulated state implementation authority under the Medicare program to redress perceived unfair-
ness in the scope of the program, particularly its denial of benefits to the working poor).
110. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987).
111. Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending as a Regulatory Device, 26 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 277, 277-88 (1989); see generally Calvin R. Massey, Etiquette 77ps: Some Implications of
"Process Federalism," 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 175 (1995).
112. See Donn Tibbetts, Lift Seat-Belt Sanctions, Merrill Urges DOT Chief, THE UNION LEADER
(Manchester), Jan. 28, 1995, at A1.
113. Amy Rinard, State Pays for Its 0.10 Standard; Barring Lower Threshold for Drunk Driving,
U.S. to Withhold $127 Million, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 22, 2002, at I A; Ed Vogel, Lower Drunken
Driving Standard Sought, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Mar. 7, 2001, at B3.
114. Tom Loftus, Patton Signs Bill Abolishing Vehicle Emissions Tests in Jefferson, COURIER-J.
(Louisville, Ky.), Apr. 9, 2002, at 1.
115. Indeed, there may be situations in which the state is the only plaintiff with standing to challenge
a federal policy, such as when federal regulatory guidelines only apply directly to states rather than
individuals.
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tive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 on the ground that one of its
provisions exceeded national authority under the Commerce Clause, 16 In subse-
quent years, federal courts have, at the behest of states or state agencies,
invalidated numerous other federal statutes on similar grounds.' '7 In each of
these cases, a federal court held that some piece of national legislation exceeded
the limits of enumerated national powers.
II. HEIGHTENED PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY
In this Part, I argue that protecting individual liberties under a state constitu-
tion, like using political pressure, refusing financial incentives, filing lawsuits,
and so on, can serve as a method by which states may resist national tyranny.
Before turning to that topic, however, I begin with an overview of the ways in
which state constitutions protect individual liberties.
A. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: AN OVERVIEW
Every state in the union has its own constitution. In many of their most
fundamental aspects, the constitutions of the states resemble one another and
the federal constitution. Each state constitution, for example, was ratified by the
people of that state. Each state constitution contains a preamble setting out its
goals; lays out the powers of government; distributes those powers among a
legislative, executive, and judicial branch; and establishes a process for constitu-
tional amendment.
One of the most prominent features that all state constitutions share is some
kind of declaration of rights which, like the federal Bill of Rights, identifies and
protects a set of basic individual liberties against governmental infringement.
Virtually every state constitution, for example, recognizes a right to free speech.""
Each document protects the rights to freedom of religion, freedom from unreason-
able searches and seizures, and a jury trial. State constitutions almost univer-
sally establish rights against self-incrimination, double jeopardy, and the taking
of private property without just compensation. "9 In addition to these rights,
which parallel rights appearing in the U.S. Constitution, state constitutions also
typically contain rights that have no explicit federal counterpart, such as the
116. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992).
117. For example, in the last several years alone, states have successfully persuaded federal courts to
invalidate on sovereign immunity grounds federal statutes creating private causes of action against the
state. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (invalidating a
portion of the Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91
(2000) (invalidating a portion of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 759 (1999) (invalidating a portion of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
118. Only Delaware lacks a provision explicitly protecting this freedom.
119. See generally JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS,
CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES (3d ed. 2000) (surveying rights guaranteed by state constitutions); BARRY
LATZER, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON LAW (1995) (same).
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right to vote120 and the right to a basic education. 121
The similarities among the various state and federal constitutions go beyond
often overlapping coverage, however: the texts of the state constitutions are, at
many critical points, similar or even identical to one another and to parallel
provisions of the U.S. Constitution. 122 For example, the constitutions of thirty-
two states contain due process clauses identical to the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.123 The constitu-
tions of thirty-seven states contain language identical to the Speedy Trial Clause
of the federal Sixth Amendment. 124 Nineteen state constitutions contain a
Warrant Clause identical to that found in the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. 125 Seven state constitutions word their protections of religious
liberty identically to their federal counterpart, 126 and many more contain word-
ing that is very similar.127 Moreover, nearly every new state admitted to the
Union has been required to present to Congress, as a condition of admission, a
proposed state constitution.' 28 Congress has always felt free to demand that
proposed state constitutions contain particular language or provisions that, in
the judgment of Congress, have proven their value in the experience of states
120. E.g., MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1; MISS. CONST. art. 12, § 241.
121. See ROBERT F WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 995-1071 (3d ed. 1999).
122. State constitution drafters have traditionally used prior constitutions as models and have
borrowed freely from them. See TARR, supra note 56, at 50-55.
123. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6; ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 7; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 4; ARK. CONST. art. II,
§ 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 25; CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 8; DEL. CONST. art. 1,
§ 7; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 2;
IOWA CONST. art. I, § 9; ME. CONST. art. I, § 6-A; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 17; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7;
Mo. CONST. art. I, § 10; MONT. CONST. art. I1, § 17; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 3; NEV. CONST. art. I,
§ 8; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 14; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6; OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 16; OKLA. CONST. art. II,
§ 7; R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 2; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 2; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 7;
VA. CONST. art. 1, § 4; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3; W.VA. CONST. art. Ill, § 10; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 6.
124. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6; ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 11; ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 24; ARK. CONST.
art. 2, § 10; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16; CONN. CONST. amend. XXIX; DEL.
CONST. art. I, § 7; GA. CONST. art. 1, § I; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 14; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13; ILL.
CONST. art. 1, § 8; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 12; IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 10; Ky. CONST. art. I, § 14; MICH.
CONST. art. 1, § 20; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6; MISS. CONST. art. 3, § 26; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 18(a);
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 17; NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 6; N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 10; N.M. CONST. art. II,
§ 14; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10; OKLA. CONST.
art. II, § 20; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 10; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 9; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 7; TENN. CONST.
art. 1, § 9; UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 12; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 10; VA. CONST. art I, § 8; WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 22; W.VA. CONST. art. III, § 14; Wis. CONST. art. I, § 7.
125. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 14; ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 15; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13; HAW. CONST. art. I,
§ 7; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 6; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 11; IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 8; KAN. CONST., Bill of Rights,
§ 15; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 11; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 10; NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 7;
N.J. CONST. art. I, § 7; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 14; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 14; W.VA. CONST. art. Ii, § 6; WIs. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
126. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 4; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 4; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 3; LA. CONST. art. I, § 8;
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 5; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 2; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4.
127. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3 (providing that "no religion shall be established by law"); FLA.
CONST. art. 1, § 3 ("There shall be no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting or
penalizing the free exercise thereof.").
128. TARR, supra note 56, at 39-41.
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previously admitted, 12 9 thus ensuring a good degree of similarity among the
constitutional documents Congress has chosen to approve.
Despite the often great similarity between state and national protections for
individual liberty, there is a significant difference-or at least a significant
potential difference-between state and federal versions of protected rights:
state constitutions may offer a level of protection for such liberties that exceeds
the level of protection afforded by the U.S. Constitution. Before the ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court's decision in Barron v.
Baltimore 30 controlled the question of state authority to establish constitutional
standards for the protection of individual liberties. Under Barron, constraints in
the federal Constitution established the relevant levels of protection against
encroachment by the federal government, and constraints in the individual state
constitutions established the levels of protection against encroachment by indi-
vidual states-the two were entirely independent of one another as a matter of
positive law. '
3
The Fourteenth Amendment complicated matters. By introducing into the
federal Constitution a broad set of constraints on state power, and by incorporat-
ing into those constraints many of the limitations that the federal Bill of Rights
already applied to the federal government, 32 the Fourteenth Amendment ap-
peared to extend to all levels of government a single standard of constitutional
protection for individual rights. This appearance was deceiving. In fact, the
Fourteenth Amendment established a mandatory level of protection for indi-
vidual rights which states were constrained to observe and which was enforce-
able by federal judicial power. However, so long as states complied with federal
standards, the structure described in Barron remained undisturbed: states could
do as they pleased. The practical consequence of this duality is that federal
standards for protecting individual rights under the Fourteenth Amendment now
provide a minimal level of protection-a "floor." ''13 States remain free, how-
ever, to exceed the federal floor by providing protections for individual rights
129. Id.
130. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
131. Id. at 247.
132. Among the Court's more significant incorporation cases are Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right to a jury trial in state courts);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding an implicit right of privacy in the Third, Fourth,
Fifth, and Ninth Amendments); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding cruel and unusual
punishment by states unconstitutional); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (self-incrimination);
and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (double jeopardy).
133. I describe this as the "practical consequence" because it is not quite an accurate description of
the technical legal situation. Technically, states are as free now as they were before the Fourteenth
Amendment to establish whatever level of constitutional protection for civil liberties they deem
appropriate, including no protection at all. After the Fourteenth Amendment and the incorporation
doctrine, however, when federal standards conflict with state law, the standards set by the Fourteenth
Amendment control because of the Supremacy Clause. Therefore, state protections of individual rights
that fall below federal standards conflict and are preempted, but state standards that exceed federal
minima do not conflict and thus control.
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and liberties that exceed the federally-mandated minima. States, then, may
accord as much or more protection to individual rights as does the U.S.
Constitution, but they may not accord less. 134 To this extent, states are entirely
free to develop a body of independent state constitutional law.
To a limited extent, states have done so. The present era in state constitutional
jurisprudence can be traced to Justice William Brennan's 1977 article in the
Harvard Law Review calling upon state high courts to "step into the breach" left
by the Supreme Court's conservative turn in constitutional decisions concerning
the protection of individual liberties. 135 Brennan urged state courts to use their
state constitutions to continue the expansion of constitutional protections for
individual rights. Soon liberals, who previously saw federal constitutional law
as a ceaseless engine for expanding the rights of individuals against govern-
ment, began turning to state courts instead. State courts have since been deluged
with claims that provisions of state constitutions should be interpreted to
provide broader protection for liberties than does the federal constitution. 1
36
Many state courts have responded positively to Brennan's call, a phenomenon
sometimes called "the New Judicial Federalism."' 137 For example, state courts
have sometimes asserted their independence in the interpretation of state consti-
tutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, rejecting nar-
row federal rulings and, in some cases, adhering to Warren Court decisions that
the Rehnquist Court has since repudiated. 138 State courts have done so, more-
over, despite the fact that these rulings hold state police officers to a higher
standard than federal FBI or DEA agents operating alongside them within the
state.
This judicial independence extends across the spectrum of constitutional
liberties. In the area of free speech, for example, the Oregon Supreme Court has
departed from the federal path by holding that the Oregon Constitution provides
direct and substantial protection for obscenity. 139 In the area of personal pri-
vacy, the Kentucky Supreme Court has rejected the federal approach set out in
Bowers v. Hardwick140 and has held that the Kentucky Constitution provides
heightened protection for gay and lesbian intimate associations. 14' Since the
publication of Justice Brennan's article, state supreme courts have decided
hundreds of cases in which they interpret the state constitution to provide more
134. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980); Brennan, supra note 61,
at 500.
135. See Brennan, supra note 61.
136. See generally James A. Gardner, Introduction to I STATE EXPANSION OF FEDERAL CONSTrrUTIONAL
LIBERTIES: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN A DUAL CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM, at xxiv-xxvi (James A. Gardner ed.
1999) (describing Justice Brennan's call to state high courts and the movement that it spawned).
137. See, e.g., TARR, supra note 56, at 161-70.
138. For numerous examples, see BARRY LAT-ZER, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (1995); 2
FRIESEN, supra note 119.
139. State v. Henry, 732 P.2d 9 (Or. 1987).
140. 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986).
141. Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 493-94 (Ky. 1992).
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generous protection for individual liberties than similar provisions of the U.S.
Constitution. 142
B. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AS CHECKS ON NATIONAL POWER
I argued in Part I.B.2 that state power can be deployed to protect liberty in
three ways: by the use of affirmative powers to pursue the good; by deployment
against itself in the form of self-restraint; and by protecting liberty from
invasions at the hands of the national government. Within this framework, it
might seem that a state constitutional provision protecting individual liberty
ought to be understood solely as a straightforward example of state self-
restraint. An individual right protected by a state constitution is enforceable
only against the state. It ought to follow, then, that state constitutional liberties
are to be classified, along with any separation of powers or judicial review
established by the state constitution, simply as another method by which the
state's people protect themselves from their own state government by restrain-
ing the scope of its powers. Unquestionably, state constitutional liberties serve
exactly this purpose. Yet this view of state constitutional protection of liberty is
incomplete. Heightened state constitutional protection of individual liberty does
more than merely restrain state governments from invading the liberties of their
citizens. It is also a potentially significant method by which state power can be
deployed to check and counteract abuses of power on the national level-
particularly abuses by the U.S. Supreme Court of national judicial power.
When we think about tyranny perpetrated by the national government, we tend to
think about rights-invasive congressional measures, such as the Alien and
Sedition Acts of 1798,113 or presidential high-handedness, such as the military
internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II'44-abuses, that is to
say, by the legislative and executive branches. But liberty can also be abused by
the judicial branch, most notably when federal courts refuse to acknowledge
and protect individual rights. Abusively stingy readings of the U.S. Constitution
not only may deny litigants their rights in individual cases, but generally also
authorize other organs of government to invade liberties that they should be
required to respect. While a state might combat this brand of judicial tyranny by
invoking any of the forms of resistance mentioned earlier, state courts are
especially well-suited to play a role in resisting abuse of national judicial power,
and to do so through entirely peaceful and fully legal means. A powerful
weapon state courts may wield in such a struggle is their authority to interpret
state constitutions to provide more generous protection for individual rights than
the U.S. Supreme Court has chosen to provide under the national Constitution.
142. See James N.G. Cauthen, Expanding Rights Under State Constitutions: A Quantitative Ap-
praisal, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1183 (2000).
143. See generally JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1956) (providing an account of the laws and their historical background).
144. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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State judicial rejection of excessively narrow Supreme Court precedents
concerning the scope of individual rights helps check national power in at least
four ways. First, whenever a state court dissents from the reasoning of a U.S.
Supreme Court decision, it offers a forceful and very public critique of the
national ruling, which can in the long run influence the formation of public and,
eventually, official opinion on the propriety of the federal ruling. Second, state
rulings that depart from or criticize U.S. Supreme Court precedents can con-
tribute to the establishment of a nationwide legal consensus at the state level,
a factor which the Supreme Court sometimes considers in the course of con-
stitutional decision making. Third, generous state interpretations of individual
rights can more directly check national power by prohibiting state and local
governments from exercising authority permitted them under the U.S. Constitu-
tion to suppress certain kinds of private behavior. In so doing, state courts create
spaces in which otherwise prohibitable behavior may flourish. Finally, rights-
protective rulings by state courts can help ameliorate the harm to liberty caused
by narrow national rulings by providing protection for second-best alternatives
to the types of behavior that such national rulings permit governments to
suppress.
1. Public Dissent
Whenever a state's highest court, by constitutional ruling, recognizes a level
of protection for individual rights that exceeds levels of protection for those
rights established under parallel provisions of the national Constitution, it
registers a forceful and often very public dissent from rulings of the U.S.
Supreme Court. This kind of state constitutional rejectionism makes news-not
merely among members of the bar or those who follow legal affairs, but in the
mainstream press as well-and such publicity inevitably influences long-term
public understandings of the appropriate content of constitutionally guaranteed
rights.
A particularly vivid example of the newsworthiness of state constitutional
rejectionism is the extensive press coverage devoted to the Georgia Supreme
Court's 1998 ruling in Powell v. State.145 Powell made news because it rejected
in a highly dramatic as well as ironic fashion the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in
Bowers v. Hardwick.146 In Bowers, the U.S. Supreme Court sustained a Georgia
statute prohibiting the practice of sodomy.147 Georgia authorities had invoked
the statute to prosecute a gay man for engaging in consensual, homosexual
sodomy in his own home. 148 The defendant challenged the constitutionality of
the state law on due process grounds, arguing that established federal constitu-
tional rights of privacy and sexual autonomy prohibited the criminalization of
145. 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998).
146. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
147. Id. at 189.
148. Id. at 187.
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sodomy between consenting adults. The Supreme Court chose to interpret the
defendant's attack upon the statute in narrower terms, as seeking a judicial
declaration of a substantive due process right to engage in homosexual sod-
omy. 149 The Court declined to issue such a ruling, applied a deferential standard
of review, and sustained the Georgia law, holding along the way that nothing in
the Due Process Clause prohibits states from enacting into law their moral
condemnation of homosexuality and of gay sexual practices. 5 0
In Powell, the Georgia Supreme Court entertained a challenge to the very
same law at issue in Bowers. This time, the defendant was a heterosexual male
who had been convicted of engaging in sodomy with a female within the home.
The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the statute under the Due
Process Clause of the Georgia Constitution15 '-a provision worded identically
to the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and which the Georgia
Supreme Court had construed, like its federal counterpart, to embody a constitu-
tional right to privacy.' 52 Rather than follow the U.S. Supreme Court's reason-
ing in Bowers, however, the Georgia Supreme Court simply brushed it aside.
Pointing out that it was not bound by parallel constructions of the U.S.
Constitution and could construe Georgia's Due Process Clause more generously
than the U.S. Supreme Court had construed the federal Due Process Clause in
Bowers,153 the Georgia Supreme Court invalidated the challenged statute. "We
cannot think," the court said, "of any other activity that reasonable persons
would rank as more private and more deserving of protection from governmen-
tal interference than unforced, private, adult sexual activity."1
5 4
As it did in Bowers, the State attempted to justify in moral terms its invasion
of the privacy interest identified by the court, but this time without success:
"'[I]t does not follow,"' said the court, "'that simply because the legislature has
enacted as law what may be a moral choice of the majority, the courts are,
thereafter, bound to simply acquiesce."" 55 Finally, the Georgia Supreme Court
could have attempted to harmonize its ruling with Bowers by invalidating the
law only as applied to consensual heterosexual sodomy, preserving the statute
for use against homosexuals. Instead, in what appears to be a deliberate rebuke
to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Georgia court seemingly invalidated the state
statute on its face, an action that dramatically underscored the greater rights-
protectiveness of its ruling. '
56
The ruling in Powell prompted an explosion of news reports, editorials, and
opinion pieces. The decision was reported not only in the usual legal specialty
149. Id. at 190.
150. Id. at 196.
151. Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 20.
152. Id. at 21-22.
153. Id. at 21 n.1, 22 n.3.
154. Id. at 24.
155. Id. at 25 (quoting Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 125 (Mont. 1997)).
156. Id. at 24-26.
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publications such as the National Law Journal and Texas Lawyer,157 and not
only in local newspapers such as the Fulton County Daily Report and Georgia's
leading paper, the Atlanta Journal and Constitution;158 but also in print media
all across the nation. National publications such as Time, Newsweek, USA Today
and Jet all ran articles about the ruling, 59 as did major papers with national
circulation such as the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post,
Chicago Tribune, and Boston Globe. 160 The Powell ruling also received exten-
sive coverage in newspapers serving much smaller markets. Stories about the
ruling appeared in newspapers in Houston, New Orleans, St. Louis, Seattle,
Minneapolis, Baltimore, Bergen County (New Jersey), Memphis, Austin (Texas),
Jacksonville (Florida), Greensboro (North Carolina), Palm Beach; and Chatta-
nooga (Tennessee), among many others.'
6 '
The media response was not, however, limited merely to reporting. Editorial
writers took to the editorial pages, largely to praise the Georgia Supreme
Court's action. The St. Petersburg Times, for example, likening the U.S. Su-
preme Court's decision in Bowers to its notorious decisions in Dred Scott 6 2 and
157. Georgia High Court Strikes State Sodomy Statute, NAT'L L. J., Dec. 14, 1998, at B20; Angela
Ward, Gay Rights Group Will Challenge State Anti-Sodomy Law, TEX. LAW., Nov. 30, 1998, at 4.
158. Both papers ran numerous articles reporting on and discussing the case and its fallout. See, e.g.,
Jonathan Ringel, Action Seen Variously as Good for Gays, Bad for Incest Law, No Big Deal for DAs,
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Nov. 24, 1998, at 1; Though Seldom Enforced, Sex Statute Meant a Lot,
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Nov. 30, 1998, at 1; Bill Rankin, Georgia Supreme Court: A Shift in
Philosophy, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 20, 1998, at HI; Bill Rankin, Sodomy Ban Thrown Out,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 23, 1998, at A1; Bill Rankin, Sodomy Decision Stems from 1905 Privacy
Ruling, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 27, 1998, at El.
159. Richard Lacayo, Where the Right Went Wrong, TIME, Dec. 28, 1998, at 107; George F. Will,
What Courts Are Teaching, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 7, 1998, at 98; Larry Copeland, Georgia's Sodomy Law
Overturned, USA TODAY, Nov. 24, 1998, at IA; Georgia's Anti-Sodomy Law Is Overturned, JET, Dec.
14, 1998, at 58.
160. Kevin Sack, Georgia's High Court Voids Sodomy Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1998, at A16;
Claudia Kolker, Legal Assaults Against States 'Anti-Sodomy Laws Multiply, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1998, at
A5; Ga. Sodomy Law Struck Down, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1998, at A 12; Anti-Sodomy Law Struck Down
by State's High Court, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 24, 1998, § 1, at 10; Georgia Court Rules Sodomy Law Violates
Privacy Rights, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 24, 1998, at A5.
161. R.A. Dyer, Ruling May Affect Sodomy Case in Texas, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 24, 1998, at 21;
Georgia High Court Reverses Sodomy Law, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Nov. 24, 1998, at
A 10; Georgia's High Court Strikes Down Sodomy Law, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Nov. 24, 1998, at
A I1; State Court Overturns Law That Made Sodomy a Crime, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 24,
1998, at A3; Rosalind Bentley, Activists React to Repeal of Georgia Sodomy Law, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis, Minn.), Nov. 25, 1998, at 3B; Georgia Sodomy Statute Nullified, BALT. SUN, Nov. 24,
1998, at IA; James Pilcher, Georgia Sodomy Ban is Reversed, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Nov. 24,
1998, at A 14; Georgia Supreme Court Slaps Down Sodomy Law, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Nov.
24, 1998, at A5; Pauline Arrillaga, Georgia Sodomy Ruling Could Affect Texas Case, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Nov. 24, 1998, at A2; Georgia Briefing, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Jacksonville, Fla.), Nov. 26,
1998, at B2; Dusty Nix, Georgia's Unnatural Acts of Lawmaking, NEWS & REC. (Greensboro, N.C.),
Nov. 30, 1998, at A9; Charles Levendosky, Georgia Ruling a Long Overdue Boost for Freedom, PALM
BEACH POST, Dec. 1, 1998, at 15A; Court Overturns Ga. Sodomy Law, CHATTANOOGA FREE PRESS, Nov.
23, 1998, at A7.
162. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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Plessy v. Ferguson,16 3 praised the Georgia Supreme Court for "grant[ing]
Georgia residents a protection the U.S. Supreme Court should have granted all
of us 12 years ago: privacy in the bedroom."' '6 The Charleston Gazette (West
Virginia) gave a "hurrah" for Powell, expressed the wish that "this policy
becomes standard throughout America," and took the opportunity to criticize
"age-old attempt[s] by severe moralists to control how others make love."' 165 In
a particularly sophisticated editorial, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette observed that:
A generation ago, it was some state supreme courts that winked at fundamen-
tal violations of human rights while the U.S. Supreme Court acted boldly to
correct injustices....
In an ironic turnabout, the Supreme Court of Georgia recently invalidated a
criminal law against sodomy that the U.S. Supreme Court allowed to stand by
a 5-4 vote in a notorious 1986 decision .... 166
According to the paper, the "overriding issue" in both cases "was privacy, not
sex. And now, Georgia's Supreme Court has grasped that fact, putting the U.S.
Supreme Court to shame." 167 The Norfolk Virginian-Pilot likewise called for the
government to get "out of the bedroom," and urged the Virginia Legislature to
take inspiration from the Georgia ruling and "get rid of Virginia's antiquated,
pernicious antisodomy law."'
168
By 2003, this kind of criticism of Bowers had found a new and receptive
audience-on the United States Supreme Court itself. In Lawrence v. Texas,
16 9
the Court overruled Bowers by a six-to-three vote, invalidating on due process
grounds a criminal defendant's conviction under a Texas sodomy law for
engaging in sex with another man. In reaching this decision, the majority
expressly noted that "[i]n the United States criticism of Bowers has been
substantial and continuing, disapproving of its reasoning in all respects."' 70 It
also cited the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Powell as an example of a
state court declining to follow Bowers in construing "provisions in their own
state constitutions parallel to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."
17 1
Of course the Powell decision and the subsequent media reaction was only
one event in a barrage of criticism of Bowers that came from many sources over
163. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
164. Editorial, Get Government Out of Bedrooms, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 29, 1998, at 2D.
165. Editorial, Privacy: Leave Adults Alone, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (W.Va.), Dec. 3, 1998, at 6A.
166. Editorial, Privacy Prevails: Georgia's Supreme Court Strikes Down a Sodomy Law, PITrSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 7, 1998, at A16.
167. Id.
168. Editorial, Privacy, Please: Kill the Sodomy Law, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk, Va.), Dec. 3,
1998, at BI0.
169. 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
170. Id. at 2483.
171. Id.
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a period of seventeen years, and did not by itself trigger the Supreme Court's
reversal of position. The reaction to Powell, moreover, was certainly one of the
more extreme examples of how state constitutional rejectionism may affect
public opinion. However, even less significant or less well-covered state consti-
tutional rulings may, in the long term, and when multiplied many times over,
have similar impacts on public opinion and ultimately on the content of national
constitutional law. Criticism of Supreme Court rulings by state courts cannot
alone restrain abuses of national judicial power, of course, yet it is hardly
irrelevant to such restraint. Official criticism of federal actions by holders of
high state offices may from time to time find an attentive audience. And
although it may take a long time, national public opinion is eventually reflected
even in the rulings of Supreme Court Justices who, after all, are nominated and
confirmed by democratically elected and accountable national officials. 1
72
2. Establishment of State-Level Legal Consensus
Another way in which state courts sometimes exert an indirect influence on
the exercise of national judicial power is by contributing to the establishment of
a national legal consensus at the state level. Such a consensus among the states
can then influence federal courts in their own constitutional decisionmaking.
This process can proceed in one of two ways. First, state constitutional decision-
making can simply influence federal courts by the persuasiveness of its reason-
ing. If the reasons supporting state constitutional rulings apply at all in the
national setting, federal courts may adopt or at least be influenced by such
reasoning.173 The more state courts agree among themselves, the more influence
their collective position may have upon federal reasoning in cases arising under
the U.S. Constitution. But there is also a second and far more robust way in
172. See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL APPOINT-
MENTS PROCESS (1994) (tracing the influence of ideology in the process of nominating and confirming
Supreme Court justices); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. oF PUB. L. 279 (1957) (setting out a theory of how public opinion comes to
be reflected in the composition of the Court). A large body of political science literature supports the
proposition that a Justice's ideology is a very important determinant-many would say the single most
important determinant-of judicial decisionmaking. See, e.g., HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL,
MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999);
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993); Jeffrey
A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 557 (1989). For a comparable study of judicial decisionmaking on state supreme courts,
see LAURA LANGER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN STATE SUPREME COURTS (2002).
173. This aspect of state court influence on federal constitutional law has been discussed at length
and has been praised as a useful form of state-federal dialogue on common constitutional issues that
leads to development in the law. See Ann Althouse, Federalism, Untamed, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1207,
1219-20 (1994); Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial
Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 128-30 (2000); Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority
in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1159-63 (1993); Rachel A. Van Cleave, State
Constitutional Interpretation and Methodology, 28 N.M. L. REV. 199, 203-05 (1998). For an earlier,
related example, see Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas
Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977).
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which state constitutional adjudication affects federal rulings: by contributing to
the establishment of a consensus that federal courts can use as a meaningful
reference point for federal constitutional adjudication. This phenomenon is seen
with increasing frequency in U.S. Supreme Court decisions that elaborate the
meaning of the Due Process Clause.
American courts proceeding in the fashion of the common law have a long
tradition of examining judicial decisions from other jurisdictions. 74 Sometimes
courts turn to decisions from other jurisdictions out of mere prudence. For
example, courts may want to make sure they have not overlooked any signifi-
cant arguments or considerations, or they may wish to examine decisions from
other jurisdictions for the persuasive value of their reasoning. Yet there is
another reason why courts consult peer institutions, one rooted in the Black-
stonian conception of the common law as the embodiment of truth: the deci-
sions of other courts may furnish important evidence of the "true"-or at least
the "best"-content of rules of law. ' 75 The fact that forty-four states follow one
rule of tort liability and only six follow an alternative rule is not conclusive
evidence, even in the Blackstonian tradition, that the majority rule is the
"correct" one, but it is impressive nonetheless, and courts often respond to such
considerations. 1
76
Constitutional adjudication bears more than a passing resemblance to com-
mon law adjudication.' 77 Occasionally, federal courts contemplating some deci-
sion under the U.S. Constitution will consult the rulings of state courts in the
common law fashion, opening themselves to influence and persuasion. Certainly
the premier example of this is Mapp v. Ohio'17 in which the U.S. Supreme
174. For an influential empirical study of the diffusion of decisional law from state to state, see
Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV.
773, 796-97 (1981). See also Gregory A. Caldeira, The Transmission of Legal Precedent: A Study of
State Supreme Courts, 79 Am. POL. ScI. REv. 178, 179-80 (1985); Bradley C. Canon & Lawrence
Baum, Patterns of Adoption of Tort Law Innovations: An Application of Diffusion Theory to Judicial
Doctrines, 75 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 975 (1981).
175. Blackstone held that common law rules embody "the wisdom of the ages," I WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 64 (William Carey Jones ed., 1915), and should
thus be treated as expressions of true principles on the ground that "no individual or even an entire
generation can match the experience and wisdom accumulated over countless generations and reposited
in the law." GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 64 (Tony Honor6 & Joseph
Raz eds., 1986).
176. See, e.g., Matter of Ind. State Bar Ass'n, 550 N.E.2d 311, 316 (Ind. 1990) (Shepard, C.J.,
dissenting) ("Fifty state supreme courts have examined the questions about which [we] write today and
forty-nine of them have reached the opposite conclusion. The fact that Indiana stands alone on this
issue does not mean that we are wrong, but it certainly does not prove we are right. Instead, I think it
suggests that this might be a moment to heed the advice we often give to juries: 'Re-examine your own
views in light of the opinions of others."').
177. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 884-88
(1996); see also James A. Gardner, The Positivist Revolution That Wasn 't: Constitutional Universalism
in the States, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 109, 117-28 (1998) (describing universalist approaches to
state constitutional law in which state constitutions are understood to embody universal principles of
natural rights that apply in all settings under all constitutions).
178. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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Court adopted the exclusionary rule, which requires the suppression of unconsti-
tutionally seized evidence, as a means of enforcing the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures.' 79 In reaching this
decision, the Court was deeply influenced by an emerging consensus among
state courts, which it carefully and extensively documented, that suppression of
illegally seized evidence was the most effective way to deter constitutionally
unreasonable searches.' 80
The issue the Court confronted in Mapp had its genesis in the Court's 1914
decision in Weeks v. United States.'8' In Weeks, the Court held that the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures required the
suppression of evidence seized by federal officials in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 8 2 In 1949, the Court considered for the first time whether to
extend the exclusionary rule to evidence seized unconstitutionally by state
officials in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Wolf v. Colorado, the Court declined to do so.' 8 3 Acknowledging that the
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures was "'implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty,"' and thus protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court nevertheless ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require the
states to adopt any particular remedy for violations by state officials of the
substantive guarantee. 84
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied heavily on what it characterized
as a "contrariety of views of the States" on how best to enforce the constitu-
tional ban on unreasonable searches and seizures. ' 8 5 Since its decision in Weeks,
the Court noted, forty-seven states had reviewed their practices concerning the
use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence. 86 Thirty-one states, the Court
observed, rejected use of the exclusionary rule, and only sixteen had adopted
that approach.' 87 From this array of rulings, the Court concluded that exclusion
of illegally obtained evidence was not regarded as vital to protection of the
underlying right and thus could not be considered incorporated in the Four-
teenth Amendment's protection of fundamental liberties.' 88
A mere dozen years later, the Court returned to the exclusionary rule in
Mapp. Utilizing the same standard and the same methodology, however, it
reached the opposite conclusion, holding that the exclusion of unconstitution-
ally seized evidence had since Wolf become an aspect of the ordered liberty
179. Id. at 654-55.
180. Id. at 650-52.
181. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
182. Id. at 398.
183. 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949).
184. Id. at 27 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
185. Id. at 29.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 30-31.
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protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 189 In 1949,
the Court explained, "almost two-thirds of the States were opposed to the use of
the exclusionary rule."' 90 By 1961, however, "more than half of those since
passing upon it, by their own legislative or judicial decision, have wholly or
partly adopted or adhered to" the rule.' 9' The Court placed special emphasis on
a ruling by the California Supreme Court adopting the exclusionary rule as a
matter of federal and state constitutional and state evidentiary law, in which the
California court found that other remedies had "completely failed to secure
compliance with the constitutional provisions."' 192 Finding California's experi-
ence consistent with that of other states, the Court overruled Wolf and incorpo-
rated the exclusionary rule into the Fourteenth Amendment's definition of
protected liberty. 1
93
Since Mapp, and particularly in the last fifteen years or so, the Court has
turned increasingly to this more robust form of reliance on state court decision-
making. Rather than merely opening itself to persuasion by the reasoning and
experiences of state courts, the Court has increasingly used the content of state
law to provide a baseline against which to measure whether any particular
individual right can be considered part of the fundamental liberty protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment. In earlier periods, the Court tended to focus, as it
did in Wolf and Mapp, on whether a particular right could be considered
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." In its contemporary due process
jurisprudence, however, the Court now tends to utilize a slightly different
formulation that focuses on whether the liberty in question is "'deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition, ' "1 94 an analysis that it cannot perform
without some examination of the content and evolution of state law.
Moreover, in reviewing American legal traditions as embodied in state law,
the Court has repeatedly examined whether legal patterns in the states have
persisted into the present.' 95 This new, heavy emphasis on the recent and
contemporary content of state law gives state courts even greater opportunities
to influence the shape of national constitutional doctrine. In Bowers v. Hard-
wick, for example, the Court declined to recognize what it characterized as a
due process privacy right to engage in consensual homosexual sodomy. 196 In
189. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-58 (1961).
190. Id. at 651.
191. Id.
192. Id. (quoting People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 911 (Cal. 1955)).
193. Id. at 658.
194. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 503 (1977)).
195. See, e.g., id. at 723 ("[W]e are confronted with a consistent and almost universal tradition that
has long rejected the asserted right, and continues explicitly to reject it today[.]"); Cooper v. Oklahoma,
517 U.S. 348, 356 (1996) ("We are persuaded, by both traditional and modem practice .... that the
State's argument must be rejected."); Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 615 (1990) ("This
American jurisdictional practice is, moreover, not merely old; it is continuing.").
196. 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986).
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reaching this decision, the Court relied on a detailed review of the history of
state regulation of sodomy, noting that before 1961 "all 50 States outlawed
sodomy, and today, 24 States and the District of Columbia continue to provide
criminal penalties for sodomy performed in private and between consenting
adults." 197
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, the Court recognized a due
process constitutional right to be free from unwanted medical treatment, but
held that the right had not been violated by a state law that prohibited termina-
tion of life support for a person in a persistent vegetative state without clear and
convincing evidence that the person, if competent, would so wish.' 9 8 Both
aspects of the Court's rulings were heavily informed by its survey of past and
present state law concerning the content and application of state doctrines of
informed consent. Some of the state cases the Court consulted that recognized a
right to refuse treatment, the Court explicitly noted, were based on a combina-
tion of state common law and privacy rights recognized under state constitu-
tions. 99
This trend continued in Cooper v. Oklahoma, in which the Court invalidated
on due process grounds a state law requiring a criminal defendant to prove his
incompetence to stand trial by clear and convincing evidence.20 0 The Court
held, on the basis of "both traditional and modern practice,', 20 ' that such an
elevated standard was inconsistent with due process. "Contemporary practice,"
the Court observed, "demonstrates that the vast majority of jurisdictions remain
persuaded that the heightened standard of proof imposed on the accused in
Oklahoma is not necessary to vindicate the State's interest in prompt and
orderly disposition of criminal cases. 2 0 2 Similarly, in Washington v. Glucks-
berg,20 3 the Court refused to recognize a due process right to physician-assisted
suicide based upon a review not only of seven hundred years of "Anglo-
American common law tradition, ' 204 but also upon a review of contemporary
legislative and judicial attitudes toward the practice. The Court thus found it
relevant that "[iln almost every State ... it is a crime to assist a suicide,, 20 5 and
that "the States' assisted-suicide bans have in recent years been reexamined and,
generally, reaffirmed., 20 6 The Due Process Clause cannot be understood to
recognize such a right, the Court concluded, because "we are confronted with a
consistent and almost universal tradition that has long rejected the asserted
197. Id. at 193-94.
198. 497 U.S. 261, 278-82 (1990).
199. Id. at 271 ("Most courts have based a right to refuse treatment either solely on the common-law
right to informed consent or on both the common-law right and a constitutional privacy right.").
200. 517 U.S. 348, 368-69 (1996).
201. Id. at 356.
202. Id. at 360.
203. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
204. Id. at711.
205. Id. at 710.
206. Id. at 716.
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right, and continues explicitly to reject it today.,
20 7
Most recently, the Court in Lawrence v. Texas overruled Bowers, finding that
the Due Process Clause protects a personal right of private sexual autonomy
sufficiently broad to encompass homosexual unions. 20 8 The majority opinion
devoted extensive consideration to the historical claims made in Bowers, finding
them unfounded. Instead, the Court recharacterized the historical record, argu-
ing that "American laws targeting same-sex couples did not develop until the
last third of the 20th century.,2 0 9 The Court then turned to state practice and
policy following its 1986 decision in Bowers, noting expressly that several
states had repealed or ceased to enforce existing sodomy statutes, and that five
state appellate courts had construed their state constitutions to require invalida-
tion of state sodomy laws on due process grounds. The Court concluded by
proclaiming: "As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can
invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom"211°-a surprising
acknowledgement of the ability of the instrument to evolve in response to
changes in official and public opinion and practice.
The U.S. Supreme Court's approach in due process cases arising under the
Fourteenth Amendment suggests strongly that state courts have the ability to
influence indirectly the content of nationally guaranteed liberties through their
rulings under cognate provisions of state constitutions. More to the point, it
seems possible for state courts to use this process to work actively, if slowly, to
undermine Supreme Court interpretations of the U.S. Constitution with which
they disagree. 21 ' The possibility of engaging in this kind of resistance is
increased by the widespread tendency among state high courts to consult rulings
207. Id. at 723; see also Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (rejecting equal protection challenge to
state law that permitted patients to refuse lifesaving treatment but that prohibited physician-assisted
suicide on the ground that past and contemporary state law makes a clear distinction between actions
that permit death to occur naturally and actions that unnaturally hasten it).
In a recent decision, the Court invoked traditional and contemporary views to hold that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits execution of mentally retarded defendants. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002). In reaching this result, which required the Court to reverse the stand it had taken in Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), the Court held that public opinion on the issue had evolved significantly
in the intervening thirteen years. It deduced this evolution from a plethora of recent state statutory
initiatives that restricted execution of the mentally retarded. The case thus differs somewhat from those
discussed in the text in that the Court relied solely on state legislative rather than state judicial activity.
208. 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
209. Id. at 2479.
210. Id. at 2484.
211. This process need not be used solely to expand individual rights; it can also contract them. A
national overexpansion of individual fights could just as easily be understood as "abusive," especially
when it sets up a conflict with other perceived fights such as property or economic fights. A good
example is state constitutional protection for speech in shopping malls, which was challenged unsuccess-
fully as violating either nationally protected rights of property owners to exclude unwanted individuals,
or their entitlement to compensation for the loss of the power to exclude. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr.
v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980) (rejecting Fifth Amendment takings claim). A state is free to set its
own protection for uncompensated takings at a higher level, and in so doing, attempt to influence the
content of federal Fifth Amendment doctrine.
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from other states when construing their own state constitutions.212 Thus, much
as the common law evolves and converges by mutual consultation across
jurisdictions, constitutional law may evolve in the same way-particularly
when the controlling methodology of interpretation under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment places considerable emphasis on the emergence of consensus on the state
level. By working to form a consensus at the state level, then, state courts may
employ state constitutional law as a tool to resist incorrect and abusive interpre-
tations of the U.S. Constitution by federal courts.213
3. Creation of a Protected Space for Prohibitable Behavior
I have focused thus far only on indirect routes by which state constitutional
decisions influence the exercise of national power-methods that operate by
influencing over the long term the U.S. Supreme Court's conception of the
scope of federally protected rights. There are, however, at least two ways in
which state constitutional rulings granting state citizens heightened individual
rights can much more directly and immediately counteract the impact on
individual liberties of oppressive federal constitutional rulings: first, by making
it more likely that there will be some space for certain kinds of private behavior
that the U. S. Supreme Court permits American governments to suppress; and
second, by providing space for private behavior that amounts to second-best
alternatives to the types of behavior the Supreme Court permits governments to
suppress.
To say that someone holds a right or is free to exercise some liberty generally
means that he or she may engage in some kind of private behavior without fear
of punishment by the government against which the right or liberty is held.
212. MARY CORNELIA PORTER & G. ALAN TARR, STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS IN THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM xxi-xxii (1980); TARR, supra note 56, at 199-200.
213. Others suggest additional ways in which state law can influence the content of federal rights.
Akhil Reed Amar points out that some provisions of the federal Bill of Rights, such as the Seventh
Amendment's right to a jury trial, implicitly incorporate standards established by state law into the
content of the right. The same is true regarding the Fifth Amendment's recognition of constitutionally
protected property rights, which are established by state law. See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: Lord
Camden Meets Federalism-Using State Constitutions to Counter Federal Abuses, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 845
passim (1996). Such limitations do not necessarily rely on state constitutional law, although they may
do so if the relevant standards have been constitutionalized rather than created by statute or the
common law.
Calvin R. Massey argues that state constitutional rights are incorporated into the national Bill of
Rights by the Ninth Amendment in a kind of "reverse preemption." Calvin R. Massey, The Antifederal-
ist Ninth Amendment and Its Implications for State Constitutional Law, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1229,
1232-33; see also Vincent Martin Bonventre, Beyond the Reemergence- "Inverse Incorporation" and
Other Prospects for State Constitutional Law, 53 ALB. L. REV. 403, 415-18 (1989) (similar idea).
Massey's account is much more robust than the one set out in this Article. According to Massey, under
the Ninth Amendment, a state polity can bind national officials to observe rights granted by its own
state constitution even when the national constitution does not otherwise require national officials to do
so. I take a different view: the Supremacy Clause allows national officials to do as they please so long
as they observe the requirements of the U.S. Constitution. The limitations on national power established
by the Ninth Amendment pose a different question and, in my view, not one that receives a different
answer in different states.
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Nevertheless, the fact that some right or liberty may be constitutionally guaran-
teed does not, in our system, affirmatively grant anyone the right to engage in
any particular behavior. On the contrary, under the theory of government laid
out in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and numerous deci-
sions of the Supreme Court, the general rule is that anyone may engage
privately in any behavior whatsoever until some government with the power to
curtail the behavior invokes that power and restricts the activity in question. 1 4
This is the model of negative liberty that dominates American constitutional
law. 215 Consequently, to have a constitutional right to engage in some behavior
typically means less that one has the freedom to act than it means that
government may not restrict the behavior by prohibiting it. For most practical
purposes, these two understandings of constitutional right amount to the same
thing, for in organized society, one is generally free to engage in an activity only
insofar as one's government is disabled from restricting it. But once we begin
dealing with more than one government at a time, as we inevitably must in a
federal system, the difference between these two understandings takes on
greater significance.
When a federal court takes a restrictive view of the scope of some individual
liberty guaranteed by the U. S. Constitution, it does nothing by itself to restrict
in any way the actual ability of any person to engage in any particular behavior.
Rather, the main significance of such a ruling is that it authorizes the national
legislative and executive branches to enact and enforce laws that prohibit or
restrict some kind of behavior in which people would otherwise wish to engage.
Moreover, since the 1960s, when the Supreme Court developed the incorpora-
tion doctrine under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a
federal individual rights ruling that authorizes the national government to
suppress some kind of behavior usually amounts to a similar authorization to
state and local governments to suppress the same behavior. Thus, a stingy ruling
on individual rights by the U. S. Supreme Court for the most part amounts to an
authorization to every government in the United States to suppress the behavior
in question should it choose to do so-it declares a kind of open season against
the private activity that is the subject of the ruling.
Here, however, is where the difference between constitutional authorization
214. With the notable exception of the Thirteenth Amendment, which forbids slavery by private
individuals, it is generally assumed that the U.S. Constitution applies only to government actors. This is
the source of the "state action" requirement. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). The
default assumption that individuals are entitled to do as they wish until restrained by lawful authority
probably has its roots in Enlightenment theories of government, which generally take the state of nature
as their point of reference. Thus, John Locke said that people in the state of nature are in "a state of
perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit."
LOCKE, supra note 7, § 4; cf HOBBES, supra note 9, at 107. Still, Enlightenment philosophers did not
think that even the state of nature was a state of unlimited freedom: the "law of nature," given directly
by God, contained some inherent limitations on human behavior. See LOCKE, supra note 7, § 4, 6-8.
215. BERLIN, supra note 28, at 122-31. For a contrary view, see Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights
and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (1999).
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to suppress behavior and actual legislative use of that authorization begins to
make a difference. If the Supreme Court holds that the Constitution does not
forbid governmental power to be used to restrict some particular activity, then
the national government and all fifty state governments may restrict it. But, of
course, they need not do so. A decision by one state to invoke this authority and
suppress the activity typically will not in any way affect the ability of people in
any other state to engage in that activity.216 Thus, the impact of a federal
constitutional ruling on individual rights is typically felt by any individual only
if the authority to suppress behavior is invoked legislatively either by Congress
or by the legislature of the state in which the individual resides.
Because of this architecture of the federal system, state constitutional rulings
can thus serve as actual antidotes-of a limited scope, to be sure, but antidotes
nonetheless-to abusively restrictive federal judicial interpretations of federally
guaranteed individual rights. A ruling by a state supreme court recognizing
heightened protection of the very same individual right that the U.S. Supreme
Court has already held to be narrowly protected by the national Constitution is a
ruling that revokes the state government's authority to exercise the power which
the federal courts have granted it to suppress the behavior. The practical effect
of such a ruling is that only one government-the national government-is then
permitted to punish the behavior in question.
But not all governments are equivalent in their ability to suppress all varieties
of constitutionally prohibitable behavior. In practice, the power of the national
government to suppress behavior within any given state is often only a fraction
of the power that the state government has to suppress the same behavior.
National law enforcement resources must be spread around the entire country,
and the ability of the national government to detect and punish prohibited
behavior is often limited; it is certainly far less than the ability of the state
government to detect and punish the behavior.2t 7 Moreover, as shown in Part
I.B.2, the national government often requires the cooperation of the states to
achieve its programmatic goals, cooperation which will not be forthcoming if
state officials are barred under their own state constitutions from providing the
requested assistance. 218 As a practical matter, then, to enjoy protection from
216. This reasoning has been invoked, for example, to criticize the Supreme Court's decisions
establishing an individual right to obtain an abortion. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 995 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing Roe v. Wade for settling the abortion issue at the
national level, thereby short-circuiting a national debate and preventing states from making their own
determinations about whether and to what extent to protect an individual's right to an abortion).
217. For example, in 2000, the federal government employed 88,496 armed officers authorized to
make arrests. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
STATISTICS (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/fedle.htm (last revised Aug. 8, 2003). In
1996, state and local governments employed over 900,000 such officers. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS (2000), available at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/sandlle.htm (last revised Jan. 29, 2003).
218. A particularly stark example of this phenomenon is the refusal of the Portland, Oregon police
department to cooperate with the FBI's effort to interview approximately 5,000 young men of Middle
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punishment of some activity by state government is sometimes to enjoy close to
complete protection from any governmental punishment at all.
A concrete example may help to illustrate the point. Libel laws permit
individuals to sue and recover damages from those who publicly circulate
defamatory statements about them. In a 1964 case, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that libel laws are subject to evaluation under the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution because they restrict freedom of speech.219 Since this
decision, litigants have clashed over the scope of the First Amendment's
protection for speech that has the potential to harm the reputation of others. One
question that sometimes arose was whether the First Amendment protected
statements of opinion from punishment; many took the position that expressions
of opinion, unlike assertions of fact, were sheltered from civil liability rules
under the First Amendment. In its 1990 decision in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal
Co.,220 the U. S. Supreme Court held that couching a statement in the form of
an opinion does not cloak it with constitutional immunity from libel rules. 22 '
After Milkovich, any legislature in the United States was thus constitutionally
free to craft libel laws that punish the expression of defamatory opinions. While
most libel rules would be expected to appear at the state level, it is not
inconceivable that Congress might also enact a libel law within the scope of its
admittedly more limited powers. For example, there might be a plausible
argument that Congress could enact libel laws to protect national government
officials and candidates for office from unwarranted attacks, especially if it
could be shown that highly qualified candidates were being deterred from
seeking national office because they feared smear attacks by their opponents.2 2 2
A year after the Supreme Court's decision in Milkovich, the same issue
reached the New York Court of Appeals, New York's highest court.2 23 That
court disagreed with the Supreme Court's handling of the opinion question. Of
course, it could do nothing about the Supreme Court's interpretation of the First
Amendment of the U. S. Constitution. However, the New York Constitution also
Eastern descent in the weeks immediately following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United
States. Portland police claimed that the FBI's program amounted to a kind of unjustifiable racial
profiling forbidden by Oregon law. See Fox Butterfield, A Police Force Rebuffs FB.L on Querying
Mideast Men, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2001, at B7. Nearly two dozen cities have enacted resolutions
expressing concern that federal antiterrorism efforts are not adequately respectful of the civil rights of
local citizens, and some jurisdictions have passed measures that forbid local law enforcement officials
from cooperating with rights-invasive federal investigations. Michael Janofsky, Cities Wary of Antiter-
ror Tactics Pass Civil Liberties Resolutions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2002, at Al. On the topic of state
constitutional restrictions that impede state officials' cooperation with the national government, see
generally William Van Alstyne, "Thirty Pieces of Silver" for the Rights of Your People: Irresistible
Offers Reconsidered as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 16 HARV. J. L. & PuB. POL'Y 303 (1993).
219. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964).
220. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
221. Id. at 20-21.
222. Article 1, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution, which grants Congress the power to regulate the
time, place, and manner of congressional elections, may authorize an election code containing such a
provision.
223. See Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 1277 (N.Y. 1991).
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has a provision protecting freedom of speech,224 and in Immuno AG. v. Moor-
Jankowski, the New York court interpreted that provision to provide broader
protection for free speech than the First Amendment-sufficiently broader to
create a free speech privilege for expressions of opinion. Consequently, the
court held, New York's libel law may not constitutionally punish expressions of
opinion. 25 After Milkovich and immuno AG., libel law in New York State looks
something like this: Congress has the authority to enact libel laws that punish
the expression within New York of defamatory opinions, but New York State
may not.
How safe is it, then, to express defamatory opinions in New York? Very safe.
New York itself is constitutionally disabled from punishing such speech. No
other state's law, no matter how restrictive, is likely to apply, at least so long as
the opinion is expressed within New York and not distributed outside the
state.226 Congress could conceivably enact a libel law that would reach within
New York, but it has not-nor is it likely to do so. Even if it did, the
applicability of the law would likely be so limited that it could conceivably
affect only an extremely small proportion of the defamatory opinions expressed
in the state. By choosing to accord defamatory opinions a higher degree of
protection under the New York Constitution than they receive under the U. S.
Constitution, the New York Court of Appeals assured the survival of a consider-
able public sphere in which the expression of such opinions would remain
unpunishable. In so doing, it undid a great deal of the harm to the public
good-if harm there was- caused by the Supreme Court's decision in Milko-
vich.
Or consider the Supreme Court's search-and-seizure jurisprudence under the
Fourth Amendment. In a series of cases, the Court drastically curtailed the
scope of this right, making it easier to obtain search warrants on the testimony
of anonymous informants,227 carving out a "good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule,228 and holding that neither aerial surveillance22 9 nor canine
sniffs230 amount to searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
224. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8.
225. Immuno AG., 567 N.E.2d at 1277.
226. Things get a bit more complicated if a libelous statement published in the state is distributed
beyond its borders. Although libel would likely be within the reach of another state's long-arm statute,
see Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775 (1984) (no due process violation in applying a
state's long-arm statute to defamatory language contained in a magazine published outside of the state
but regularly circulated within it), the important question is which state's law would apply in
adjudicating the libel claim. The "single-publication rule," see Debra R. Cohen, The Single Publication
Rule: One Action, Not One Law, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 921, 940 & n.80 (1996), suggests, though it does
not compel, the conclusion that the law of the state of publication would apply. Id.; LUTHER L.
McDOUGAL Ill ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS OF LAW 454-55 (5th ed. 2001). Not all states follow the rule,
however, and it might not apply where there is only one place of publication.
227. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983).
228. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984).
229. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445,452 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
230. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983).
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Numerous states have rejected these rulings when construing parallel provisions
of their own state constitutions. 231 To the extent that a state considers these
national rulings tyrannical or an abuse of national power, contrary state constitu-
tional rulings check the extent of the abuse by withdrawing from state law
enforcement authorities the power to follow police practices that the national
Constitution now permits.
It is true, of course, that a more rights-protective state constitutional ruling
cannot prevent federal FBI and DEA agents operating in the state from using the
looser, federally authorized search practices. Nevertheless, the impact of the
state ruling may be considerable. In most states, the likelihood that any person
will come in contact with federal law enforcement officials is minuscule in
comparison to the likelihood of contact with state or local police who are
subject to the restrictions of the state constitution.232 The state constitutional
ruling, then, creates a space-a public sphere of potentially considerable
scope-in which citizens of the state may enjoy a freedom from police searches
that, in the view of the state polity, creates a more appropriate relationship
between private conduct and official power.
4. Protection of Second-Best Liberties
A second way in which heightened state protection for individual rights can
serve as a direct, if limited, check on abuses of national judicial power is by
assuring the existence of some space for private behavior that is a second-best
alternative to the types of behavior that narrow federal interpretations of
nationally protected rights permit governments to suppress. As a rule, national
power tends to be spread thinly throughout the states, and to touch the lives of
most citizens lightly. There are, however, some areas in which national power
231. Cases rejecting the Court's liberalization of rules for obtaining warrants from anonymous
informants include State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 326 (Alaska 1985); People v. Campa, 686 P.2d 634,
642 (Cal. 1984); Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548, 559 (Mass. 1985); State v. Cordova, 784
P.2d 30, 37-38 (N.M. 1989); People v. Griminger, 524 N.E.2d 409, 411-12 (N.Y. 1988); State v.
Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 437 (Tenn. 1989); State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136, 143-44 (Wash. 1984). The
federal good faith exception has been rejected by State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58, 68 (Conn. 1990); State
v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 663-65 (Idaho 1992); State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 871-72 (N.J.
1987); People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451, 455-58 (N.Y. 1985); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d
887, 899 (Pa. 1991); State v. Oakes, 598 A.2d 119, 126-27 (Vt. 1991). The Supreme Court's approach
to aerial surveillance has been rejected in People v. Cook, 710 P.2d 299, 304-07 (Cal. 1985) and in
People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1356 (N.Y. 1992). The Court's approach to canine sniffs has been
rejected in McGahan v. State, 807 P.2d 506, 513 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991); People v. Unruh, 713 P.2d
370, 381-82 (Colo. 1986); State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710, 719 (N.H. 1990); People v. Dunn, 564
N.E.2d 1054, 1059 (N.Y. 1990); and Commonwealth v. Johnston, 530 A.2d 74, 82 (Pa. 1987).
232. According to the U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Statistics, federal agencies in
2000 employed 88,496 full-time law-enforcement personnel. Sixty percent of this total worked for the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Federal Bureau of Prisons, FBI, and Customs Service. More
than a quarter of these officials were deployed in only two states, Texas and California. See U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS, supra note 217. In contrast, state and local law
enforcement agencies in 1996 employed nearly one million full-time personnel. See U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS, supra note 217.
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penetrates American life deeply, if narrowly. In these areas, national standards
prevail and there may be nothing states can do to limit their impact on the
activities subject to federal regulatory standards. When national power is de-
ployed in this way and used to achieve a purpose antithetical to the public good,
liberty is irrevocably lost.
Liberty means, among other things, the freedom to live one's life in a certain
way.233 When national power is carefully targeted and then deployed to maxi-
mum effect, it is fully capable of choking off certain ways of life. That is, of
course, the very definition of effective power, and the Constitution grants
powers to the national government in ways designed to make them effective
234 inswithin their legitimate scope. Thus, in such cases, the exercise of national
power can close off certain ways of life, resulting in a loss of liberty to those
who value that way of life and wish to pursue it.
A state that views such an exercise of national power as an abusive invasion
of liberty has at its disposal no fully legal means to undo directly the particular
harm committed by the national government. A lawful exercise of national
power, backed by the Supremacy Clause and the threat of enforcement, is
enough to make that harm stick. Nevertheless, it may be possible for the state
government to ameliorate that harm indirectly by using its lawful powers to
expand and protect liberty in other directions. One important way in which the
state can accomplish that objective is by providing heightened protection under
the state constitution to other liberties that are related to the liberty that national
power has denied, or which might in some circumstances plausibly substitute
for it.
For example, until 1994, national drug laws that criminalized the possession
and distribution of peyote235 prohibited some Native Americans from practicing
their religion in traditional ways. The enforcement of drug proscriptions tends
to be heavily federalized.2 36 The U.S. Supreme Court, moreover, ruled in 1990
that applying a statutory peyote ban to Native American religious rituals does
not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the U. S. Constitution.23 7
Several states reacted to this ruling defiantly by enacting initiatives authoriz-
ing the medical use of marijuana, another drug the possession of which is
barred, subject to heavy penalties, by national law.23 8 Lawsuits brought by
233. Cf JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 407-16 (1971) (describing the notion of a life plan).
234. Though limited, the powers of the national government are said to be plenary within their
sphere. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 324 (1819).
235. 21 U.S.C. §§ 811-12 (1994). However, the Drug Enforcement Administration had by regulation
exempted the sacramental use of peyote from prosecution. 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1999). Apparently this
regulation was respected by the Justice Department in its enforcement policies.
236. See 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1994) (establishing extensive schedules of controlled substances).
237. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990). Although the
precise facts involved a state statute, the ruling clearly applied equally to federal criminal statutes.
238. See Lauryn P. Gouldin, Controlled Substance Law: Cannabis, Compassionate Use and the
Commerce Clause: Why Developments in California May Limit the Constitutional Reach of the Federal
Drug Law, 1999 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 471,471 & nn. 1-3.
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federal prosecutors in federal court resulted in the swift invalidation of these
measures, however, weaving the Supreme Court's approach to drug laws deeply
into the fabric of judicial oversight of law enforcement activities. 239 Although
these rulings concern marijuana, not peyote, their relevance to Native Ameri-
cans is clear: state defiance of national drug laws will not be tolerated. Until
Congress voluntarily chose to exempt Native Americans (and only Native
Americans) from the reach of the peyote ban,240 national power was applied
systematically and effectively to preclude a group of citizens--certain Native
Americans-from living a particular kind of life, one in which they might take
part in what they consider to be important sacred rituals. As far as these
individuals were concerned, their liberty had been irrevocably impaired.24'
Moreover, should congressional tolerance for the sacramental use of peyote flag
and Congress rescind the exemption, Native Americans would again be in the
position of being barred by federal law from practicing their religion as they
believe they must.
A state whose people thought such an exercise of national power abusive
could do nothing short of outright, escalated defiance of federal law-nothing,
that is, by legal, nonviolent means-to win for Native Americans the right to
use peyote in religious rituals. It is true that state courts could invalidate state
anti-peyote laws on free exercise grounds, 42 but federal prosecution of drug
crimes is fairly ubiquitous, and Native Americans are a small group who are
already subject to extensive federal oversight. Nevertheless, even in these
circumstances, it may well be within the power of state governments to use
constitutional or statutory means to protect other enclaves of religious liberty in
the hope that the uncomfortable effects of a contraction of liberty at one point in
the system might be offset in some way by an expansion of liberty elsewhere.
For example, virtually every state constitution contains a provision that, like
239. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyer's Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 490 (2001). However, so
far, lower federal courts have rebuffed efforts by the federal government to press its approach further.
The Ninth Circuit enjoined enforcement of a federal policy that would have revoked the medical
licenses of doctors who prescribed or recommended to patients the use of marijuana for medical
purposes. Conant v. Walters, 309 E3d 629, 639 (9th Cir. 2002). In a similar context, a federal district
court enjoined a federal policy of revoking the licenses of doctors who prescribed or administered
controlled drugs to terminally ill patients under Oregon's Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 127.800 et seq. (2001), which legalized medically assisted suicide for certain terminally ill patients.
Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1092 (D. Or. 2002).
240. American Indian Religious Freedom Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 103-344, 108 Stat. 3125
(1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (2000)).
241. As Michael McConnell remarked, "[aipplication of the anti-drug laws to the sacramental use of
peyote effectively destroys the practice of the Native American Church." Michael W. McConnell, Free
Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109, 1134 (1990).
242. A few state courts have refused to follow the Supreme Court's analysis in Smith and have
instead continued to adhere to the Court's prior analysis of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), or
one very much like it. See Ohio v. Bontrager, No. 6-95-17, 1996 WL 612374, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.
1996); First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 210 (Wash. 1992); Wisconsin
v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235, 240 (Wis. 1996). However, no state court appears to have invalidated a state
criminal prohibition of peyote use on state constitutional grounds.
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the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
requires states to treat all religions neutrally, a requirement that prohibits states
from endorsing any particular religion. The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted
the Establishment Clause narrowly in recent years, holding that overtly religious
symbols associated with the major religions may be displayed prominently on
public property in certain circumstances without violating the Clause.24 3 Critics
of this decision sometimes claim that it takes insufficient account of the context
in which such symbols are displayed, a context in which these displays look to
those who do not practice the major religions very much like official endorse-
ments of Christianity, and occasionally of Judaism and Islam. z4" The idea that
the state endorses certain religious ideas and not others may then be perceived
by dissenters as marginalizing and oppressive.
A state, however, is free to take a more expansive view of state constitutional
prohibitions on government support for religion than the Supreme Court has
taken of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. A state constitutional
ruling barring any displays of religious symbols on public property might
expand the liberty of Native Americans in a way that could help ameliorate
some of the harm they might feel from the federal proscription of peyote.
Native Americans are a tiny minority in this country. Like other religious
minorities, they probably feel their identity is put under constant pressure by the
ways in which a largely Christian majority unreflectively takes the assumptions
and practices of Christianity to be those of religion in general.245 It is of course
this very kind of thinking that accounts for the fact that federal drug laws, until
recently, made no exception for the ceremonial use of peyote; things undoubt-
edly would have been different if peyote use were part of Christian ritual. The
unreflective invocation of religious symbols by those who practice majority
religions is one of many potential sources of pressure on minority religious
identity. A state ruling barring the display of any and all religious symbols on
state and local government property might go some way toward easing this
pressure. It might send a welcome message of inclusion and understanding. In
one way or another, it might use state power to confront and counteract a
potentially liberty-impairing use of national power.246
243. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984).
244. See id. at 700-01 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("inclusion of the creche in its display would serve
the wholly religious purpose of 'keep[ing] Christ in Christmas"'); see also id. at 701 ("The effect on
minority religious groups, as well as those who may reject all religion, is to convey the message that
their views are not similarly worthy of public recognition nor entitled to public support.").
245. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 696 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]his case appears hard not because the
principles of decision are obscure, but because the Christmas holiday seems familiar and agreeable.");
William van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on
Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 786 (referring to the Court's interpretation of the Establishment
Clause as "secularized Christian ethnocentrism").
246. Research disclosed no state decision rejecting Lynch as a matter of state constitutional law. At
least one state court has followed Lynch under its state constitution. See King v. Vill. of Waunakee, 517
N.W.2d 671, 675 (Wis. 1994).
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A more difficult example is presented by recent uses of national power to
severely restrict the use of affirmative action in employment and education.
2 47
Affirmative action programs give preferences in employment or educational
opportunities to members of minority groups that historically have suffered
disadvantages as a result of official discrimination. Such programs originally
were justified as a kind of compensation for opportunities denied in the past. 4 8
More recently, supporters have also justified affirmative action programs as a
way to achieve a desirable racial and ethnic diversity in workplace and univer-
sity settings.249 For a time, national law permitted moderate affirmative action
programs.2 5 ° In the last decade, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has inter-
preted the Equal Protection Clause in a way that sharply restricts the constitution-
ality of national or state laws that extend employment and, to a somewhat lesser
extent, educational preferences to minorities. The Court's theory is that such
preferences often amount to a kind of reverse discrimination against majority
groups such as whites and males.2 5' Moreover, national law in this area is
privately enforceable in antidiscrimination suits,2 5 2 so any lack of vigilance by
government enforcement officials is of little consequence.
Suppose the people of a state see the Court's rulings in this area as a
tyrannical use of national power-one that entrenches an unjust status quo in
247. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235-36 (1995) (invalidating federal
set-aside program for minority-owned businesses); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 488 U.S. 469,
509-11 (1989) (same for municipal contracting set-aside program); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476
U.S. 267, 293-94 (1986) (invalidating state teacher layoff program that gave rehiring preference to
racial minorities); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 951-53 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033
(1996) (invalidating consideration of race in public law school admission program). The Court has
similarly invalidated reliance on race, at least when it is excessive, in the redistricting context. See
Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920-21 (1995).
248. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307-10 (1978) (state citing remedy
of past discrimination as justification for minority quota system in medical school admissions).
249. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 556 (1990) (FCC justifying consideration of race
in awarding broadcast licenses as a way of increasing diversity of broadcast programming); Hopwood,
78 F.3d at 935-37 (noting that law school justified the use of race in admissions as a way of achieving a
more diverse student body).
250. See Metro Broad., 497 U.S. 547, 598-601 (upholding FCC's minority preference in broadcast
licensing program); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491-92 (1980) (upholding federal minority
business set-aside requirement in funding local public works projects); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-19
(expressing in dicta approval of educational affirmative action plans that only consider race as one
factor among many).
251. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 230 ("Any individual suffers an injury when he or she is disadvan-
taged by the government because of his or her race, whatever that race may be."); Croson, 488 U.S. at
493 ("The Richmond Plan denies certain citizens the opportunity to compete for a fixed percentage of
public contracts based solely upon their race. To whatever racial group these citizens belong, their
'personal rights' to be treated with equal dignity and respect are implicated by a rigid rule erecting race
as the sole criterion in an aspect of public decisionmaking."). The Court recently took a somewhat more
relaxed view of educational preferences in Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2411 (2003), and Grutter v.
Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325 (2003).
252. For example, reverse discrimination suits can be brought generally under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and
in more specific settings under statutes such as Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, and the Voting Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973a.
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which members of racial minorities suffer from continuing bias and social or
economic structural disadvantages. Suppose the state's people think this in-
fringes the liberty of racial minorities by impairing their ability to live the kinds
of life they wish to live-lives characterized by meaningful educational opportu-
nities and dignified, remunerative work. What, if anything, can be done to
counter this use of federal power? Affirmative action presents a more difficult
problem than the peyote example because of the extraordinary reach of the
equal protection principles at issue. If national law prohibits a state from
offering distinct advantages to blacks in employment or education, a state
probably cannot invoke its constitution to provide blacks with some other kind
of advantage because the Supreme Court's rulings seem to prohibit states from
offering any kind of advantage to blacks that is not available equally to whites.
The entire field of racial relations is so hemmed in on all sides by national law
that it may prove exceedingly difficult for a state to counteract a national
contraction of liberty by expanding liberty in any directly related area.
In this situation, states may be relegated to protecting liberties that are only
tangentially related to the liberty that has been denied at the national level, and
which thus constitutes a distinctly "second-best" kind of substitute. For ex-
ample, it is possible that a state constitution might be used to expand the liberty
of racial minorities in other directions by recognizing a constitutional right to
public reparations for past discrimination, though, even here, it seems possible
that the Supreme Court's construction of the Equal Protection Clause might in
some circumstances invalidate such a provision. 3 If the liberty of racial
minorities to enjoy educational and employment opportunities cannot be ex-
panded in any direction without violating federal law, perhaps the state constitu-
tion could be interpreted to confer upon minorities some kind of right to
noneconomic opportunities, such as cultural integrity or cultural expression. 4
There is, to be sure, an important difference between a constitutional right to
pursue economic opportunities and a right to pursue cultural ones. The way of
life associated with the second path may be quite different from the one
associated with the first, and perhaps less widely or intensely desired by those in
a position to benefit from the offered liberty. But even when state power is
limited to offering liberties that are only substitutes for the liberties national
power has denied, state power might nevertheless plausibly be understood as
asserting itself against national power in the only way it can.
In making these arguments, I certainly do not wish to be understood to say
that liberty is a single or fungible entity. If the national government invades
liberty in one sphere in ways that states are powerless directly to affect, it is not
necessarily the case that a state expansion of personal liberty in a different
253. It is possible that the Court would view a generalized reparations payment, not limited to
victims of specifically identified prior instances of discrimination, as just another kind of affirmative
action program that discriminates on the basis of race.
254. See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS chs.
5-6 (1995).
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sphere automatically counterbalances the harm. 55 To be sure, each liberty is
different,256 and giving people one kind of liberty instead of another will not
and should not satisfy everyone, especially those to whom the denied liberty is
extremely important. When the denied liberty has structural functions that affect
politics, such as free speech or association, the harm may be irremediable. But it
may well be that for a great many people, expanding opportunities to pursue
one kind of liberty may help even the score for the denial of others. Liberty, as I
have indicated, does not compel behavior; it opens up opportunities for people
to live certain kinds of lives if they so choose. Denying a liberty in any respect
limits in some way the kinds of lives people are able to lead. But expanding
liberty in another direction expands life choice options. Undoubtedly, some
people who value highly the opportunity to live a certain kind of life will not be
mollified by the opportunity to live a different kind of life to which they do not
aspire. But there may be many other people who do value that kind of life more
than the kind that has been denied, or who are indifferent between the two.
These people will be made better off by state expansion of a wholly different
kind of liberty. For such individuals, a state's use of its constitution to provide
heightened protection for individual rights may indeed be a relatively potent
tool with which to combat national tyranny.
III. CONSEQUENCES FOR STATE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
In the preceding Part, I tried to show how state courts' rejection of federal
precedents or reasoning regarding individual rights, and the judicial expansion
of individual liberty under state constitutions beyond that granted by correspond-
ing federal judicial interpretations of the national Constitution, can be forms of
legitimate resistance to abuses of national judicial power. Not surprisingly, this
functional or tactical use of state constitutional law has potentially significant
consequences for the interpretation of state constitutions by state courts.
Contemporary jurisprudential thought about the interpretation of state consti-
tutions tends to be mired in well-worn ruts that lead to two competing and
unhelpfully rigid models of interpretation. 57 The first and most widely held
255. As Michael E. Solimine and James L. Walker remind us, rights are not "commodities, like corn
or electricity." MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE & JAMES L. WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS: THE INEVITABILITY
OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 12 (1999).
256. Cf MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983) (arguing that justice means different things in
different contexts).
257. Not everyone has been content with the existing interpretational categories. Recently, G. Alan
Tarr and Robert A. Schapiro have made important contributions that challenge the received wisdom.
See TARR, supra note 56; Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law,
84 VA. L. REv. 389 passim (1998). A recent article by Robert F. Williams suggests the possibility of a
new kind of synthesis. Robert F. Williams, Old Constitutions and New Issues: National Lessons from
Vermont's State Constitutional Case on Marriage of Same-Sex Couples, 43 B.C. L. REV. 73 passim
(2001). Daniel B. Rodriguez also has expressed displeasure with existing approaches. Daniel B.
Rodriguez, State Constitutional Theory and Its Prospects, 28 N.M. L. REV. 271 passimn (1998). And
Helen Hershkoff has of late been slowly and methodically dismantling the normative foundations of
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model, often labeled the "primacy" approach, holds that state courts analyzing
questions of state constitutional law should treat state constitutions as freestand-
ing, wholly independent sources of positive constitutional law. 258 This means
that state courts should interpret state constitutions by bringing to bear all the
traditional tools of constitutional analysis: text, structure, history, controlling
state precedent, and the values of the state polity.259 This analysis should be
performed, moreover, without any consideration whatsoever for analogous
rulings by federal or other state courts except for the limited purpose of
providing guidance; and courts must understand that the nature of this guidance
is merely persuasive and never controlling, regardless of any similarities be-
tween the constitutional provisions under review and those construed in cases
from other jurisdictions.26 °
The other main position, often called the "interstitial" or "supplemental"
approach, holds that state courts should turn to the state constitution only after it
becomes apparent that the U.S. Constitution provides inadequate protection for
the civil liberties at issue. Upon making such a determination, the state court
should then examine the state constitution to determine whether it provides any
additional increment of protection for the right at issue. 26 This approach is
usually associated with a methodology of state constitutional interpretation,
often labeled the "criteria" approach, which directs state courts to compare the
state constitutional provision at issue to its cognate provision in the federal
Constitution, and to construe it to have a different meaning from its federal
counterpart only if some objective indicium supports the divergent interpreta-
tion.262 The indicia sufficient to support a divergent interpretation typically are
said to include differences in the constitutional text, structure, or history;
differences in controlling state precedent; and differences in the concerns or
values of the local populace.263
Neither of these models is satisfactory either as a normative guide to or an
present state constitutional adjudicatory practices. Hershkoff, supra note 215; Helen Hershkoff, State
Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833 passim
(2001).
258. TARR, supra note 56, at 183-85.
259. See Hans Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REv. 165,
179-93 (1984) [hereinafter Linde, E Pluribus]; Hans Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the
States'Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379, 387-92 (1980) [hereinafter Linde, First Things First].
260. See, e.g., Linde, E Pluribus, supra note 259, at 176-79; Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme
Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353,
356 (1984); Robert F. Williams, Methodology Problems in Enforcing State Constitutional Rights, 3 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 143 (1987).
261. TARR, supra note 56, at 182-83; Dennis J. Braithwaite, An Analysis of the "Divergence
Factors ": A Misguided Approach to Search and Seizure Jurisprudence Under the New Jersey Constitu-
tion, 33 RUTGERS L.J. I, 5-22 (2001); Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of
Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 713 (1983); Note, Developments in the Law: The
Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1326, 1330-31 (1982).
262. See TARR, supra note 56, at 182-83; Friedman, supra note 173, at 104-05.
263. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952 (N.J. 1982); State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (Wash.
1986).
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accurate description of the judicial practice of interpreting state constitutions.2 64
The functional approach I have sketched here, however, holds the promise of
breaking this impasse and arriving at an account of contemporary state constitu-
tional jurisprudence that is far more normatively attractive than the dominant
approaches, as well as more descriptively accurate of actual judicial practice.
Although they differ in significant respects, both the primacy and interstitial
approaches share a critical underlying assumption. Both jurisprudential philoso-
phies begin from the premise that state courts may not construe state constitu-
tional rights differently from the way federal courts construe national
constitutional rights merely because they disagree with the federal decisions on
the merits. 265 Indeed, the entire course of development of contemporary theo-
ries of state constitutional interpretation may usefully be understood as an
attempt to shield state courts from charges that they have issued rights-
expansive state constitutional rulings solely because they disagree with specific
rulings of the Burger or Rehnquist Courts.26 6
This premise, I believe, is fundamentally false. The functional approach to
state power I have sketched here suggests that state courts should be doing
exactly what their critics accuse them of doing. That is to say, when state courts
disagree with a Supreme Court decision construing the U.S. Constitution, they
may interpret similar provisions in state constitutions differently precisely
because they believe that the U.S. Supreme Court has misinterpreted the
national document, thereby according insufficient protection to the legitimate
rights and liberties of the American people-liberties that it is in part the
function of state courts to protect.
267
264. For criticism, see generally James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism,
90 MICH. L. REV. 761 (1992); Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism,
106 HARV. L. REV. 1147 (1993); Schapiro, supra note 257.
265. Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-Away from a Reactionary Approach, 9
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 2-3 (1981); Peter J. Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial Activism
Among State Supreme Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 731, 786 (1982); Ken Gormley, Ten Adventures in
State Constitutional Law, 1 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CONST. L. 29, 35 (1988); A.E. Dick Howard, The
Renaissance of State Constitutional Law, I EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CONST. L. 1, 12-13 (1988); Paul S.
Hudnut, State Constitutions and Individual Rights: The Case for Judicial Restraint, 63 DENVER U. L.
REV. 85, 95 (1985); Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 61 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 399, 418 (1987); Richard D. Simons, When is the New York Court of Appeals Justified in
Deviating from Federal Constitutional Interpretation?, 14 TouRo L. REV. 637, 645-47 (1998). Expres-
sions of similar sentiments can also be found in the case law. See, e.g., State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233,
235 (Vt. 1985) ("It would be a serious mistake for this Court to use its state constitution chiefly to
evade the impact of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court.... Our decisions must be
principled, not result-oriented .. "). But see Peter Linzer, Why Bother with State Bills of Rights?, 68
TEx. L. REV. 1573, 1607 (1990) ("In construing its own state provision, a state court is justified in
refusing to follow the majority in the United States Supreme Court if it can make a plausible argument
that the Supreme Court decision makes no sense.").
266. See TARR, supra note 56, at 178-80; George Deukmejian & Clifford K. Thompson, Jr., All Sail
and No Anchor-Judicial Review under the California Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975, 975,
1009-10 (1979); Friedman, supra note 173, at 94.
267. Cf Wayne D. Moore, Reconceiving Interpretive Autonomy: Insights from the Virginia and
Kentucky Resolutions, II CONST. COMMENT. 315 (1994) (describing the belief, expressed in the Virginia
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To be sure, state courts interpreting provisions of the state constitution cannot
be guided solely by their reaction to decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court
interpreting the U.S. Constitution. State constitutions are still enactments of
positive law that may be adopted for particular purposes and subject to particu-
lar restrictions that state courts are bound to obey.2 68 A state court's agreement
or disagreement with related national precedent thus will seldom be the only, or
even the controlling, determinant in its constitutional decisionmaking. But the
court's reaction to federal precedent most certainly can and should be a factor to
be weighed in the analysis.2 69 Indeed, it is difficult to see how state courts could
discharge their responsibilities in the federal system by doing otherwise.
The methodological errors of the primacy and interstitial approaches to
interpretation can be explained, moreover, largely by their incorrect premises
about the nature of state power within the structure of American federalism. The
primacy approach conceives of state constitutional interpretation as a self-
contained enterprise whose only point of reference is the state constitution
itself. To interpret a state constitution, say the proponents of the primacy
approach, one must treat it no differently than one would treat the national
constitution: as an expression of the will of the people of the state.27 0 This
might be a valid approach if an American state were an independent nation, and
the United States were nothing more than a league of independent sovereigns
connected for a few common purposes by a treaty or compact. But the United
States is not a compact of independent sovereigns; it is a nation-if the Civil
War settled anything, it was that.
The interstitial approach veers too far in the opposite direction. By accepting
interpretations of the U.S. Constitution as presumptively binding on state courts
interpreting state constitutions, the interstitial approach treats state constitutions
as having virtually no independent legal agency. State constitutional law, in this
model, is treated not as an independent body of positive law authored by a
distinct self-governing polity, but as a local and subordinate iteration of positive
law established at the national level. This would perhaps be a valid approach if
states were merely administrative subdivisions of the nation and thus had no
legitimate authority to pursue and enact into law their own independent judg-
ments concerning the structure and conditions of local self-governance. But, of
course, states are more than administrative subdivisions of the nation. Although
the principle of national supremacy circumscribes their independence, they
nevertheless have considerable leeway to make independent decisions about
and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, that states possess independent authority and a responsibil-
ity to interpret national constitutional norms).
268. See James Gray Pope, An Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 985,
988-1000 (1993) (describing instances in which state constitutions embody real, identifiable, and
significant decisions by the state polity).
269. The precise way in which this particular factor should be considered in the complex mix of
factors in constitutional analysis is a topic I expect to address in a future work.
270. See Schapiro, supra note 257, at 396-404.
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how best to promote and protect the welfare and liberty of their citizens-
decisions which they are able to back up because they possess a considerable
amount of independent political power.
The truth, of course, lies somewhere in between the two models. States are
neither independent sovereigns nor subordinate subdivisions. State polities
govern themselves to some extent, but are also governed to some extent by
decisions made at the national level. States are not free to maneuver wholly
according to their independent judgment, yet they are expected to serve as
independent checks on abuses of national power by the national government.
State power is to be exercised in the service of goals established by the state
polity, but it is also to be exercised in the service of goals established nationally.
Neither the primacy nor the interstitial approach captures these complexities,
and consequently each prescribes a methodology of constitutional interpretation
that fails to accord with the reality that state judges routinely face when
adjudicating questions of state constitutional law.
The functional approach sketched here, I hope, charts a course out of this
impasse. By treating state power as having an essential function derived in part
from the national structure of federalism, the functional approach recognizes
that state power always exists in relation to national power and never in
isolation from it. A state constitution is a document fundamentally ordering the
exercise of state power. Consequently, a state constitution must generally be
interpreted with one eye on the U.S. Constitution and on the actions of the
national government taken in reliance on it. Only by monitoring the operation of
the national government can any organ of state government fulfill its responsibil-
ity to discover and resist abuses of national power. Certainly, the national
government will be watching the state. Federalism requires that this practice be
reciprocal. Where individual rights are concerned, this means that state courts
should always be prepared to exercise independent judgment about the propri-
ety of U.S. Supreme Court rulings and, when appropriate, to resist and work to
undermine those rulings of which they disapprove.27'
A related common complaint about state constitutional adjudication, heard
especially from advocates of the primacy approach to interpretation, is that state
courts too often proceed in "lockstep" with federal courts, which is to say that
they too often merely copy federal constitutional law by reflexively adopting the
terminology, analyses, and results of U.S. Supreme Court decisions rendered
under the national Constitution. 72 For example, according to former Oregon
Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde:
271. Cf Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 Sup. CT.
REV. 61, 67 ("Constitutional interpretation should be a shared endeavor among ... all the branches of
the national, state, and local governments.").
272. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-The Montana Disaster, 63 Thx.
L. REV. 1095, 1115-16 (1985); Linde, E Pluribus, supra note 259, at 178-79; Linde, First Things First,
supra note 259, at 382-83.
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[M]ost state courts do not free themselves from Supreme Court formulas but
treat them as generic constitutional law.... Adopting timeworn verbiage in
applying similar constitutional clauses is a venial sin .... [T]he federal formu-
las take on a life of their own, copied by state courts regardless of whether the
state's law has the same clause or perhaps offers a more direct and defensible
route to the same result.
2 7 3
This criticism, however, is equally misguided for it proceeds from the same
incorrect notion that state constitutions are completely independent of national law.
Let us be realistic. Why, exactly, do state courts so frequently copy federal
constitutional doctrine and adopt it as part of state constitutional analysis? Is it
because state judges are too lazy or ignorant to conduct an independent analysis
of constitutional meaning under cognate provisions of the state constitution?
This does not seem particularly likely. The likeliest explanation is undoubtedly
the most obvious one: state judges adopt the Supreme Court's approach because
they like it and think that it does a perfectly adequate job of protecting the
liberty in question. No innovative, pathbreaking, independent analysis of the
state constitution is needed because there is no threat to liberty that the state
constitution need be invoked to counteract.274
Critics of lockstep analysis, doubtless influenced by the primacy approach,
clearly believe that mere approval of federal doctrines or analyses can never be
an adequate basis for incorporating them into state constitutional jurispru-
dence.275 Under the functional approach to state power I have described here,
however, there is nothing at all wrong with state judges adopting U.S. Supreme
Court terminology and analyses merely because they think the Court's approach
does an effective job of protecting the relevant liberties. Quite the contrary. If a
state court believes that some individual liberty is being adequately protected
under some formulation developed by the U.S. Supreme Court, it has no
particular reason to undertake the effort of independently deriving a different,
equivalent formulation to protect that same liberty under the state constitution
merely for the sake of demonstrating its independence.
To be sure, there may well be circumstances when the outright adoption of
federal doctrine is not an option available to a state court. Particularities of text,
273. Hans A. Linde, Are State Constitutions Common Law?, 34 ARIZ. L. REv. 215, 219-20 (1992).
Doctrinal convergence through direct state adoption of national constitutional law has been most
noticeable in the area of individual rights, but occurs in other areas as well. See Gardner, supra note
177, at 110-17 (describing the extent of doctrinal convergence between state and federal constitutional
law on separation of powers).
274. See SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 255 at 96 (suggesting that widespread state judicial
adoption of federal constitutional analyses need not indicate a threat to the judicial protection of
liberty). For two recent, withering critiques by state judges charging state courts with failing to adhere
to their publicly stated methodology of state constitutional interpretation, see Braithwaite, supra note
261, at 5-22, and Jack L. Landau, Hurrah for Revolution: A Critical Assessment of State Constitutional
Interpretation, 79 OR. L. REV. 793 (2000).
275. See, e.g., Linde, First Things First, supra note 259, at 392 ("To make an independent argument
under the state clause takes homework-in texts, in history, in alternative approaches to analysis.").
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
history, or the framers' intent, among other things, may compel the conclusion
that the people of the state have decided for themselves what level of liberty
they deem appropriate, and state courts may then have no choice but to obey
those commands. But if state constitutional provisions reveal no such particular-
ized popular intent, as is so often the case, a state court may justly feel that it
has considerable latitude to exercise its own independent judgment about the
adequacy of federal judicial interpretations of parallel provisions of the U.S.
Constitution, and to express those judgments in its handling of similar questions
under the state constitution. Federalism may require mutual checking, but where
there is no abuse of power there is nothing to check. State acquiescence in the
proper use of national power is no cause for concern. Indeed, if one is inclined
to think that the national government will in the vast majority of cases use its
powers in appropriate ways for appropriate ends, then one ought to expect to
find state courts adopting the corresponding federal analysis far more often than
they reject it-an intuition borne out by observation. 6
Much of the criticism of lockstep analysis seems to derive from a misunder-
standing of what it reveals. Critics seem to think that courts engaging in
lockstep analysis have revealed a willingness to abandon altogether to the U.S.
Supreme Court the field of protecting constitutional liberties.27 7 If this is indeed
what state courts are doing when they engage in lockstep analysis, then the
criticism is well taken, although for a different reason than lockstep critics
usually advance. The problem in such a case would not be that such state courts
are failing to conduct a mandatory independent analysis of the state constitu-
tion, as the primacy approach would have it, but that they are failing to
discharge the responsibility for monitoring and checking abusive exercises of
national power that a well-functioning system of federalism presupposes.278
These two functions overlap, of course, but are by no means identical.
276. See Cauthen, supra note 142, at 1194-1201; Michael Esler, State Supreme Court Commitment
to State Law, 78 JUDICATURE 25, 29-31 (1994); Barry Latzer, The Hidden Conservatism of the State
Court "Revolution," 74 JUDICATURE 190 (1991).
277. See, e.g., TARR, supra note 56, at 182 ("The lockstep approach renders state rights guarantees
superfluous.").
278. This distinction, I believe, differentiates what I am advocating here from what appear to be
recent endorsements by Robert F. Williams and Lawrence Friedman of state court disagreement with
national rulings. In a recent article, Williams argued that state court divergence from national precedent
can be seen not as mere result-oiented disagreement, but as "the product of honestly held alternative
ways of looking at a problem of constitutional interpretation and the consequences of resolving it in a
certain way." Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing Methodology and
Legitimacy Problems in Independent State Constitutional Rights Adjudication, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1015, 1049 (1997). Friedman also argues for the value of interjurisdictional dialogue in the develop-
ment of constitutional law. Friedman, supra note 173, at 137. However, both authors take this position
in the service of arguments against the criteria approach and in favor of the primacy approach.
Friedman, supra note 173, at 133; Williams, supra, at 1049. This is where we part company. The
primacy approach decrees that the proper state constitutional interpretation issues from an independent
analysis of the state constitution; that is, proper state constitutional interpretation requires an exclusive
focus on internal state interpretational guideposts, without reference to national law and national
actions. I argue here that proper state constitutional interpretation can also issue from the state judicial
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In any event, there is a more benign way to understand lockstep analysis.
Lockstep analysis, one might say, does not necessarily reveal an abandonment
by state courts of their responsibilities to protect liberty and to reflect meaning-
fully upon the best ways to do so. On the contrary, it might well represent a
discharge of those responsibilities, but in circumstances where the state court
feels that the national government is already doing a reasonably good job. In
those circumstances, a state court might reasonably conclude that there is no
need, at least for the moment, to explore in any greater depth the possibilities
presented by the state constitution to protect liberty any more or less vigorously
than it is already protected by the national judicial analysis. Lockstep analysis
thus need not represent an absence of independent constitutional judgment; it
can just as easily represent the outcome of a fully-informed exercise of indepen-
dent state judicial judgment.
To be clear, the interpretational process I have just described is not the same
as the standard interstitial approach to state constitutional interpretation. The
interstitial approach rests on two important premises. First, it treats federal
constitutional law as providing a presumptively correct standard for its state
constitutional counterpart. Second, it authorizes state courts to reach a different
result from federal law only if they can identify some objective factor of text,
history, precedent or state values to justify the divergence. Courts proceeding
under the functional approach are bound by neither of these conditions. First,
far from treating Supreme Court precedent as presumptively correct, state courts
utilizing this approach would exercise their own independent judgment about
the correctness of Supreme Court rulings. Second, state courts would be autho-
rized to depart from the Supreme Court's approach for purposes of state
constitutional interpretation not merely when some concrete indication of text
or history so requires, although that might suffice; but also when they think the
Supreme Court has erred, on the merits, in interpreting the U.S. Constitution.
Conversely, if they think the Supreme Court's rulings adequate, they may
incorporate them into state constitutional jurisprudence; but they do so not
because they think such rulings presumptively correct, but because, in the
exercise of their independent judgment, they deem such rulings to provide
adequate protection for the liberties at issue, a responsibility they share with
federal courts. Thus, state courts proceed in this fashion under the functional
approach because state courts, when they approach the state constitution, are not
limited functionally to interpreting an independent piece of positive law in the
form of a state constitution. State courts also exist to help monitor and check
national tyranny by using their powers to resist and limit the effects of abusive
interpretations of the national constitution by federal courts.
function of resisting abuses of national power. State constitutional interpretations that resist national
power can be the result of exclusively state-oriented analysis of the state constitution, but they need not
be because one of the inputs to constitutional decisionmaking does not find its source in the state
constitution itself, but in the national system of federalism.
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The dynamics of this process are well illustrated by a series of cases decided
by the New Mexico Supreme Court. In language identical to the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico
Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures., 279 For many years,
the New Mexico Supreme Court interpreted this provision in lockstep with
federal judicial interpretations of the Fourth Amendment.28° More recently,
dissatisfied with the earlier approach, the New Mexico Supreme Court in State
v. Gomez28' adopted a new approach to state constitutional interpretation which
it identified as "interstitial. 282 Normally, the interstitial approach would require
the state court to follow federal Fourth Amendment precedent unless some
peculiarity of New Mexico's constitutional environment required a different
result. Clearly, no difference of text would qualify. Yet in listing the reasons
why it might diverge from otherwise presumptively correct federal precedent,
the court included among them its independent judgment that the controlling
"federal analysis" was "flawed., 283 In so doing, the court thus gave itself
permission to interpret the New Mexico search and seizure provision differently
from the way the U.S. Supreme Court interprets the Fourth Amendment simply
if it finds the federal analysis unpersuasive.
In Gomez, that is exactly the conclusion the New Mexico Supreme Court
reached. A sheriff's deputy had conducted a warrantless search, first of the
defendant's stopped automobile and then of his fanny pack. The search uncov-
ered marijuana, which the defendant was charged with and convicted of possess-
ing. In analyzing the constitutionality of the search, the New Mexico Supreme
Court held that the warrantless searches of the automobile and closed container
were permissible under a bright-line test used by the U.S. Supreme Court in
cases involving automobiles.284 The court chose not to follow this interpretation
279. The two provisions are virtually identical in every other respect as well. The Fourth Amend-
ment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend IV. Its New Mexico counterpart provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes, and effects, from unreasonable
searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person or thing, shall
issue without describing the place to be searched, or the person or things to be seized, nor
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.
N.M. CONST. art. II, § 10.
280. See, e.g., State v. Gomez, 932 P.2d 1, 6 (N.M. 1997); State v. Garcia, 413 P.2d 210, 212 (N.M.
1966). For a general discussion of Gomez, see Robert F. Williams, New Mexico State Constitutional
Law Comes of Age, 28 N.M. L. REv. 379 (1998).
281. Gomez, 932 P.2d at 6.
282. Id. at 7.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 10 (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 576-77 (1991); United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798 (1982); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 159 (1925)).
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for purposes of construing the New Mexico Constitution.285 Its reasoning relied
not on differences of text, state constitutional history, or the values of New
Mexicans, but on its belief that the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions governing
warrantless searches of automobiles were poor ones:
[Wie do not accept the federal bright-line automobile exception. There is
some tension between the blanket automobile exception and the U.S. Supreme
Court's recent [cases, in which] the Court states: "We have eschewed bright-
line rules in applying the totality-of-circumstances test, instead emphasizing
the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry ... " We regard the
automobile exception as a failure to recognize such variations.2 86
That is the sum total of the court's explanation for departing from federal
reasoning. Even on its merits, the state court's reasoning is flimsy: there is no
inherent contradiction between adopting a bright-line approach for some circum-
stances and a case-by-case approach for others. But this seems like quibbling. It
is clear that the state court here is departing from the federal approach simply
because the court disagrees with it and prefers a different approach used by the
U.S. Supreme Court in other kinds of cases.
In later cases, the New Mexico Supreme Court recharacterized its disagree-
ment with federal precedent in Gomez as a distinctive feature of New Mexico
constitutional law which it then used to justify its departure from other, unre-
lated federal precedents decided under the Fourth Amendment. For example, in
State v. Cardenas-Alvarez,28 7 the defendant was detained at an internal border
checkpoint and found to possess a large amount of marijuana.28 8 Under federal
precedent interpreting the Fourth Amendment, the search was valid. 289 The New
Mexico Supreme Court reviewed its prior ruling in Gomez, holding that "[t]he
extra layer of protection from unreasonable searches and seizures involving
automobiles is a distinct characteristic of New Mexico constitutional law.",
290
This "distinct characteristic," the court held, justified reaching a different result
291
in the case at hand under the New Mexico Constitution.
This bootstrap reasoning is not persuasive. It seems that what the state court
is doing is once again disagreeing with the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment, and that it is doing what it can with the only tool it
has to fight the outcome dictated by federal law. What seems a shame is that the
state court feels it has to hide this purpose behind the window-dressing of an
improperly applied interstitial approach to state constitutional analysis. The
285. Id. at 6-7.
286. Id. at 13.
287. 25 P.3d 225 (N.M. 2001).
288. Id. at 227.
289. Id. at 229.
290. Id. at 231.
291. Id. at 233.
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functional approach I have outlined here gives state courts permission to do
what they are doing anyway, but without the flimsy excuses and bad disguises.
State courts are just as responsible for protecting American liberties as are
national courts. They can and should simply go about the business of protecting
those liberties without apology.
CONCLUSION
A state constitution is positive law enacted by the people of a state to order
the exercise of state power. But state power exists in our system of government
not only to pursue objectives established by the people of the individual states
for the achievement of their own separate good. State power also plays an
integral role in the American system of federalism by helping all Americans
achieve their collective good, a function it performs when it is deployed to resist
abuses of national power. State judicial power is not exempt from this dynamic.
It has obvious uses internal to the state, but it may also play a role in the
external deployment of state power for the purpose of resisting national tyranny,
especially tyranny perpetrated by national courts.
Most accounts of the function and methodology of interpreting individual
rights protected by state constitutions do not recognize this checking function of
state courts. This oversight has caused courts and commentators to conceive of
state constitutional rights solely in terms of the way in which such rights
constrain abuses of power by state governments, and to ignore their potential
role in checking abuses of power originating at the national level. But the
vigilant protection by state courts of state constitutional rights can serve as a
form of resistance to abusively narrow Supreme Court interpretations of federally
protected individual rights through mechanisms of public dissent, consensus
formation, and independent, state-level protection of identical or second-best
liberties.
To discharge fully their responsibilities to monitor and check national power,
state courts must incorporate into their state constitutional jurisprudence some
recognition and independent evaluation of the content of corresponding federal
constitutional law. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to lay out all the
details of how this might be accomplished, such a reform requires, at a
minimum, abandonment of the artificially constrained primacy and interstitial
approaches to state constitutional interpretation. Both approaches begin from
the incorrect assumption that state courts have no business evaluating and
reacting to rulings made under the national constitution by national courts. In
fact, that is just the function federalism requires state courts to undertake.
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